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Time perception is inherently a subjective experience based on the 
determination of order and duration between different events. In 1860, Karl 
Ernst von Baer, one of the most celebrated graduates of the University of Tartu, 
introduced the notion of perceptual moment – the unit of time – suggesting that 
different species have different durations of moments and consequently 
different flow of subjective time (von Baer, 1860). William James devoted a 
whole chapter (XV) of his classical The Principles of Psychology (1890) to the 
perception of time. Unexpectedly, this chapter created an illusion that the most 
important problems concerning time perception have already been solved. 
Extensive reasearh on timing in animals followed and the application of animal 
timing models to humans revived interest in the topic of time perception (for 
review, see Wearden, 2005). The era of neuroscience has further surged an 
interest in the brain mechanisms of time perception (Buhusi & Meck, 2005; 
Harrington, Haaland, & Knight, 1998; Meck, 1996).  
It was a long and obstructed journey towards the fundamental unit of time – 
second – which resulted in the acceptance of the International Atomic Time 
only in 1967. Historically, longer time intervals were measured by the 
movement of the Sun as it is seen from the Earth; shorter intervals were 
measured by periodic physiological processes such as breathing or the pulse. 
However, it was soon discovered that humans can accurately estimate intervals 
shorter than one second (James, 1890). This indicated that a more rapid periodic 
physiological or psychological process is used as a unit for time measurement. 
Although researchers put in a considerable effort to establish the shortest time-
interval between two perceptual events that can be discriminated (Dunlap, 
1915), the absolute limit was never found.  
From the very beginning it was clear that whatever the process used as a 
subjective time unit, this process is not as stable as atomic clocks based on the 
oscillations of a Cesium-133 atom. If an atomic clock deviates only 1 second in 
about 20 million years then the human internal clock is much less precise and 
vulnerable to many disturbances. In addition to the pace-holder rate itself, the 
cognitive access to the internal clock is not as easy as is the access to physical 
devices. The sense of time presupposes an additional process, which retrieves 
information from an internal clock. As any other psychological process, the 
retrieval of information from an internal clock is subjected to errors and biases 
(Woodrow, 1951). Much of human behaviour is shaped by this subjective 
temporal experience, which in turn is sensitive to both external and internal 
context. For example, temporal experience is important in sports, whether 
estimating the time-to-contact or initiating a coordinated response requiring 
perceptual-motor skills. Emotions, an example of an internal context, have a 
strong effect on the perceived passage of time, as time seems to fly when a 
person is having a good time (Gable & Poole, 2012). Additionally, time 




the succession of external events. The perception of time is essential for 
information processing, decision making and action planning in general. 
Therefore, time perception shares properties similar to visual and auditory 
perception, and should be considered in relation to other cognitive functions 
like language and memory processes (Allman, Teki, Griffiths, & Meck, 2014). 
Regarding the notable history of time perception, questions about the 
underlying mechanisms of temporal processes and factors affecting duration 
percepts still remain essential topics of research. Empirical studies of time 
perception often originate from the discipline of psychophysics, seeking to 
quantify psychological time relative to real time and applying Weber’s law to 
timing. Therefore, research in psychological time has been focused on whether 
perceived duration corresponds to physical time and explores the reasons why 
psychological and physical time sometimes fail to coincide. The questions 
raised involve the relative variability of temporal estimations, the role of 
stimulus modality, reasons for the indifference interval (i.e., the highest point of 
accuracy as the time judgments are veridical with physical durations, Lejeune & 
Wearden, 2009) among other aspects of time perception (Wearden, 2005). In 
that view, time perception is considered to possess psychophysical properties 
similar to other senses, although no particular sensory organ is responsible for 
the sense of time. Similar to visual and auditory perception, psychological time 
increases with physical time and as a result, a linear relationship between the 
intensity of temporal sensation and the magnitude of external stimulation is 
observed. Although the clock-based approach in time perception research often 
shows linear relationship between subjective and real time (Wearden & Jones, 
2007), pacemaker-free approach yielding to nonlinear scale for encoding time 
has been proposed (e.g., multiple time scales related to memory functions; 
Staddon & Higa, 1999; Staddon & Higa, 2006). 
Humans are generally accurate in estimating time even without external 
timekeepers and therefore the existence of an internal clock-like mechanism 
(Church, 1984; Treisman, 1963) with neurobiological origins has been proposed 
(Coull, Cheng, & Meck, 2011). Current theoretical models of internal clock take 
into account the properties of timing behaviour as revealed by psychophysical 
methods. The challenge is to identify the mechanism by which the internal 
clock operates. Insights about how the internal timekeeper works come from 
observed distortions in timing behaviour caused by a variety of psychological 
and physiological factors (e.g., arousal or pharmacological manipulations; 
Matell & Meck, 2000; Mella, Conty, & Pouthas, 2011; Meck, 1996). 
Manipulation of these factors promotes identification of the mechanisms by 
which the internal clock operates. 
The concept of an internal clock continues to be the most popular theoretical 
model to explain the properties of psychological time. Michel Treisman (1963) 
was the first to provide a consistent framework for describing the principles 
underlying the clock-like mechanism and time perception. His work was based 




temperature effects on duration production by systematically observing the 
relationship between changes in temperature and timing performance. Hoagland 
(1933) proposed the concept of a chemical clock, based on the observations of 
his wife counting seconds while being ill with a fever, and data from François’ 
(1927) study with two subjects producing intervals on a metronome while 
receiving diathermic treatment. Thus, the manipulation of temperature offered 
an early insight into the working of the internal clock in producing time 
judgments. The conclusion from these studies implied a temperature sensitive 
mechanism, which is affected by the arousal level of the organism (Wearden & 
Penton-Voak, 1995). Increased body temperature together with a higher heart 
rate is proposed to be the indicators of increased arousal, which speeds up the 
rate of the pacemaker according to the internal clock model. The pacemaker 
produces a series of impulses (“ticks”), which are accumulated and form a basis 
for the length of psychological time (Treisman, 1963). 
The concept of arousal within the internal clock model has generated interest 
in exploring how emotions change time perception (Schirmer, 2011). The two 
primary dimensions of emotional assessment are affective valence, ranging 
from pleasant to unpleasant, and intensity, ranging from calm to excited (Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). From the time perception perspective, the level of 
arousal is determined by the magnitude of the excitement induced by an 
emotion, which is supposed to explain the effects of emotion on behaviour (Gil 
& Droit-Volet, 2012). Hence, the intensity of emotional experience tends to be 
the most relevant factor for the arousal-based explanations of time perception. 
Even though François (1927) was interested in the effect of temperature on 
subjective duration, he nevertheless preferred to describe psychological time as 
a “complex psycho-physiological phenomenon”, implying a role of internal 
context in time perception. Indeed, when observing temporal distortions in 
relation to emotional stimuli, the role of discrete emotions should be accounted 
for in addition to systematic manipulations of arousal level. Although emotion 
theorists emphasise the overlapping properties of different emotional systems in 
the brain and especially the nonspecific arousal systems guided by the 
norepinephrine and serotonin activity, these emotional systems display distinct 
subcortical substrates (Panksepp, 2007). Thus, if the emergent emotions 
contribute to psychologically distinguishable affective states, a simple arousal-
based mechanism might not be sufficient to explain temporal distortions. 
The internal clock model clearly does not assume that the perception of time 
results from mere sensory input directly affecting the speed of the pacemaker. 
In addition to the arousal account, additional mechanisms are important in 
describing the variability of time perception within the internal clock model. 
More precisely, the contribution of attentional processes is distinguished from 
arousal effects (Zakay & Block, 1997). In this view, an adjustment has been 
made to the internal clock model by adding a switch, which is guided by 
attention and controls the accumulation of temporal pulses. Applying emotional 





in time perception, assuming that the processing efficiency of emotional stimuli 
is enhanced relative to neutral ones through attentional systems (Pourtois, 
Schettino, & Vuilleumier, 2013). Thus, if we consider that there are specific 
attention biases guiding the processing of emotional stimuli, then the emotional 
modulation of attention helps to achieve a better understanding of the internal 
clock mechanisms underlying time perception.  
Much of the contemporary research on time perception involves the 
experience of duration in passing, where the length of the interval is often used 
as a behaviourally observable variable. Currently, a clear distinction is made 
between retrospective and prospective paradigms in timing research, partly due 
to introducing the concept of attention to the internal clock model (Block & 
Zakay, 1997; Ornstein, 1969; Zakay & Block, 2004). Indeed, there is a 
difference whether a subject knows in advance that he or she is going to be 
asked to estimate temporal intervals (i.e., prospective timing) or whether he or 
she is unexpectedly asked to judge the duration that has already passed (i.e., 
retrospective timing). The differences between the two types of tasks are 
assumed to reflect the amount of attention directed towards temporal properties 
and explained in the context of attention and memory processes (Block & 
Gruber, 2014). 
Methodological considerations in time perception research involve the ways 
of linking overt timing behaviour with the temporal processing in the brain. 
Here, advanced psychophysiological techniques together with neuroimaging 
have created opportunities to observe the passage of time in the brain by 
studying the internal clock components in more detail. Neuroscience research 
has resulted in a bulk of evidence implicating specific structures in the brain as 
being responsible for temporal processing (Buhusi & Meck, 2005; Coull et al., 
2011). Pharmacological manipulations have implicated the dopaminergic 
system in regulating the speed of the internal clock (Rammsayer, 1993) and 
electroencephalographical studies describe the Contingent Negative Variation 
(CNV) as an indicator of the temporal accumulation process (Macar & Vidal, 
2004; Mella & Pouthas, 2011). Additionally, pathophysiological findings 
elucidate the neurobiological mechanisms of time perception and suggest that 
the timing ability is fundamental to cognitive and behavioural processes, 
referring to the importance of individual differences (Allman & Meck, 2012). 
Fraisse (1984), reasoning about the conditions under which time is perceived, 
also stressed the importance of the properties of the perceiver, using the term 
“subject’s own resources”. The role of individual differences in subjective time 
has created interest in exploring the trait-dependent effects in time perception. 
For example, altered temporal processing has been systematically linked with 
impulsive behaviour and impaired prefrontal cortex functioning, providing 
support either for the increased cognitive processing speed or dysfunctional 
allocation of attentional resources between time and task-relevant information 




The current thesis explores time perception by varying environmental 
conditions (Study I and Study II), but also the characteristics of stimuli (Study 
III). Also, individual differences related to time perception are investigated 
(Study IV). Studies I and II are particularly concerned with temperature 
sensitive aspects of time perception and the involvement of arousal 
mechanisms, whereas Study III sets out to clarify the attentional mechanism 
and its role in producing the duration of affective stimuli. Finally, Study IV 
describes the relationship between time perception and impulsive behaviour. 
The aim of the research presented here is to specify the factors that modulate the 
perception of time and identify the mechanisms involved (i.e., arousal or 




2 THE INTERNAL CLOCK MODEL 
Theoretically, it is possible to approach the concept of processing temporal 
information with assuming either the existence of a central clock mechanism or 
explaining it in terms of cognitive processes without the reference to the 
internal clock. The latter theoretical models explain time perception with 
attention and memory mechanisms (Staddon & Higa, 1999; Zeiler, 1999) or 
with the modality-specific processing of time (Grondin, 2003). A prevailing 
approach in the time perception literature assumes the existence of a central 
timing mechanism, a biological clock, which is responsible for generating the 
subjective representation of time. John Wearden (2005) has provided an in 
depth overview on the origins of internal clock theories. A preliminary 
theoretical model of internal clock was introduced by Michel Treisman (1963) 
and it was based on the experiments from early studies with temperature 
manipulations and the “chemical clock” hypothesis (François, 1927; Hoagland, 
1933). The main assumption of the model was the existence of an arousal-
sensitive pacemaker, which sends pulses to a counter, thus providing the raw 
material for time judgments. This basic clock mechanism is in the centre of the 
scalar expectancy theory (SET, Church & Meck, 2003; Gibbon, Church, & 
Meck, 1984; Wearden, 1991; 2003), which is based on the animal conditioning 
studies and is currently the most prominent theoretical approach in explaining 
the operating principles of the internal clock. The SET proposes a more 
complex cognitive system for time perception, as the pacemaker-counter 
mechanism is not sufficient to explain all the aspects of timing behaviour. More 
specifically, it introduces the role of memory processes as well as comparison 
and decision making mechanisms. Figure 1 shows the schematic model of the 
SET system in terms of a clock, memory and decision making stages as 
different information processing levels responsible for time perception.  
The first level of the SET model is the clock stage, which consists of a 
pacemaker-accumulator clock. The pacemaker periodically generates a series of 
pulses (“ticks”), which are recorded in the accumulator and provide the “raw” 
representation of experienced duration. It is even suggested that the length of 
the perceived duration is determined directly by the number of time units, or 
pulses, accumulated (Hemmes, Brown, & Kladopoulos, 2004; Wearden, 2005). 
These two clock components are connected by a switch that determines the 
accumulation of pulses in the counter. For example, when a stimulus is being 
timed, the switch closes at the onset of the timing process and stays closed 
during the temporal processing, allowing the streaming of the pulses to the 
accumulator. The switch opens again when the timing of the interval is 
terminated and cuts off the connection between the pacemaker and the 
accumulator. At the end of the timing process, the accumulator is expected to 
contain the amount of pulses that correspond to the duration being timed. 
Operation of the pacemaker-accumulator has been explored by manipulating 




Percival, & Wearden, 1996) or the functioning of the switch (Brown, 1997; 
Droit-Volet, 2003). Experimental manipulations on a clock stage generally 
comprise of investigating arousal and attention mechanisms, which are further 
described later in this chapter.  
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic model of the scalar expectancy theory (SET) system. Adapted 
from Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 1984. 
   
The next level of the SET is the memory stage, which consists of the reference 
memory and working memory processes. After stimulus presentation, the 
representation of timed duration is transferred from the accumulator to the 
working memory and is assumed to stay there for further processing. The 
reference memory is considered to contain the criterion duration(s), or a 
“common reference”, which is the memory of the standard or target durations 
relevant for the timing task. The reference memory is also implicated in 
generating the scalar property of timing and is partly responsible for the scalar 
variability in addition to the clock stage processes (Wearden, 2003). Research 
on the development of temporal representation suggests an active 
transformation process in forming the relevant standard duration in the 
reference memory (Jones & Wearden, 2003; 2004). Evidence from animal 
studies with changing reinforcement times further suggest that the content of 
reference memory is rather rapidly over-written (Lejeune, Ferrara, Simons, & 




















At the decision level of the SET, the contents of the working memory are 
compared to the standard duration that resides in the reference memory and is 
relevant to the task. The comparison process results in a decision about duration 
and followed by a behavioural response. The crucial role of decision processes 
is supported by studies, which applied payoff manipulations when identifying 
comparisons to standards in the timing tasks (Wearden, 2004; Wearden & 
Culpin, 1998; Wearden & Grindrod, 2003). For example, in the temporal 
generalisation task Wearden and Grindrod (2003) assigned more points either 
for hits (encourage condition) or correct rejections (discourage condition) while 
keeping the stimulus to be timed similar. The difference in either encouraging 
or discouraging subject in giving the “yes” response resulted in systematic 
changes of the response threshold. 
One of the assumptions of the SET is the aspect of proportional timing, 
meaning that instead of absolute values, the behaviour is adjusted to the 
proportions of temporal intervals (Wearden, 2005). This introduces the concept 
of scalar timing mechanism, which exhibits two scalar properties: the first being 
the mean accuracy (i.e., the mean of estimated time increases linearly with 
physical time) and the second is the scalar property of variance, which dictates 
that the timing sensitivity remains constant across the range of durations to be 
timed (Wearden & Lejeune, 2008). For the analysis of scalar variance, a 
coefficient of variation (CV) is used, where a standard deviation of temporal 
judgments is divided by the mean. Wearden and Jones (2007) provided 
evidence that subjective time grows as a linear function of real time in both 
verbal estimation and temporal generalization tasks. Moreover, in the latter task, 
subjects were extremely efficient in averaging durations to be used as a 
standard, providing further support for the existence of a linear time scale. 
These results are actually in agreement with the SET, which assumes the 
existence of a central clock mechanism registering durations in a stopwatch-like 
way. Indeed, if the pacemaker generates pulses in a regular manner, linear 
timing is achieved. Of course, the observed behaviour may not always exhibit 
scalar properties due to additional processes (e.g., very short durations and task 
difficulty effects, Wearden & Lejeune, 2008).  
Within the internal clock framework, errors in time perception may originate 
from all aforementioned processing stages and clock components – the 
pacemaker may be ticking too quickly or too slowly, the accumulator may 
occasionally miss pulses, the reference interval may be distorted in a long-term 
memory, the working-memory capacity may be disturbed and the decision 
processes disrupted. Thus, all levels of the SET could be responsible for 
generating the variance in temporal judgments, but so far, the functioning of the 
pacemaker has been particularly accounted for the variability of subjective time. 
The accuracy of time perception at the clock stage is modulated through 
attention and arousal mechanisms (Burle & Casini, 2001; Grondin, 2010; Block 




stage of the SET framework and assumes the variability of timing behaviour 
resulting from the pacemaker-accumulator functioning.  
 
 
2.1 Methodological considerations  
for studying time perception 
Time perception research clearly makes a distinction between retrospective and 
prospective time judgments (Block & Zakay, 1997; Hicks, 1992). In a 
prospective paradigm, the subject knows in advance that he or she needs to 
make a temporal estimation, whereas in the retrospective paradigm, the subject 
is unexpectedly required to judge time after the duration in question has ended. 
These operationally different paradigms are considered to involve distinct 
psychological mechanisms. Prospective timing refers to the use of a clock 
mechanism, which emits and accumulates pulses during an intentional timing 
process, whereas retrospective estimations are assumed to involve more 
cognitive processing of information. Memory processes have been implicated in 
retrospective experience of time – more information stored in the memory 
during the time passed increases the respective estimations (Zakay & Block, 
2004), as does the remembered amount of contextual change in cognitive 
activity for the estimated duration (Block, 1985; Block & Reed, 1978; Sahakyan 
& Smith, 2013). A subject would report a longer interval because it contains 
more information, which refers to the past experience and serves as an example 
of the memory processes involved in retrospective time estimation. In the time 
perception literature, the two processes are therefore often referred to as timing 
with or without a timer (Block, 2003), or as experienced and remembered time, 
respectively (Block & Gruber, 2014). SET provides a framework for the 
prospective time estimation exploring activation and attention effects on 
temporal processes (Wearden, 2005), which require a specific time-dependent 
clock-like mechanism. Here, estimation of future durations is performed in 
several ways, either by producing and reproducing intervals, or verbally 
estimating them, or making comparisons between durations (Grondin, 2010). In 
addition, the stimulus timed in different tasks may exhibit various properties 
(e.g., auditory signal is estimated longer compared to visual stimuli, Wearden, 
Edwards, Fakhri, & Percival, 1998). 
Another distinction in the time perception research is based on the range of 
durations investigated. Early research showed that overestimation is observed 
for shorter durations whereas longer durations tend to be underestimated, a 
result described as Vierordt’s law (Lejeune & Wearden, 2009). The processing 
of sub-second durations is assumed to rely on different processing mechanisms 
than that of the supra-second range (Buonomano & Karmakar, 2002; Lewis & 
Miall, 2003a; Lewis & Miall, 2003b; Lewis & Miall, 2009). The timing of 
durations in the range of hundreds of milliseconds is assumed to be more of a 




reactions, probably of a subcortical origin (Rammsayer & Lima, 1991). Timing 
in this range is, for example, reflected in the coordination of athletes applying 
motor skills or musicians playing musical instruments. On the other hand, 
estimation of durations lasting several seconds is assumed to be cognitively 
mediated and to dependend on executive functions (Lewis & Miall, 2003a). For 
example, Rammsayer & Lima (1991) showed that in an interval discrimination 
task, the performance in processing a second-long interval was considerably 
affected by the increase in cognitive load, whereas no decrements in 
performance were observed for the shorter intervals. Neuropharmacological 
evidence (Rammsayer, 1999) and data from neuroimaging (Penney & 
Vaitlingam, 2008) support the existence of somewhat separate mechanisms for 
processing durations in different ranges. Different patterns of brain activity have 
been reported during the measurement of durations either in the millisecond or 
in the multi-second range, showing the involvement of the motor system in the 
former case and the prefrontal cortex in the latter time scale (Lewis & Miall, 
2003b). Of course, there is a great deal of overlap in the neural systems when 
processing time in both duration ranges (Macar, Lejeune, Bonnet, Ferrara et al., 
2002). Conceptually, this is in concordance with the fact that most time 
judgement tasks require some sort of a motor response in addition to duration 
timing, either vocalizing a response when providing verbal estimations, or 
terminating the timing of an interval with a button press. Of course, it is 
possible to distinguish perceptual and motor properties of timing brief intervals, 
depending on the temporal task applied. More precisely, the difference resides 
in whether the motor response itself is timed (e.g., rhythmic motor tasks like 
synchronisation or interval production) or is used to indicate the judgement or 
decision about time (e.g., discrete-perceptual tasks like temporal generalisation) 
(Macar et al., 2002).  
Another concern with measuring time perception in human subjects is the 
ability to use explicit counting, a language-based strategy. Chronometric 
counting is used to ensure the accuracy of time judgment irrespective of the 
duration length and has been reported to happen spontaneously in 97% of the 
subjects engaged in a temporal task (Fraisse, 1963). When the task requires 
processing of intervals longer than 1 second, the use of chronometric counting 
by the subjects is evident (Hinton, Harrington, Binder, Durgerian et al., 2004; 
Hinton & Rao, 2004; Penney & Vaitilingam, 2008). Moreover, this occurs in 
children, when instructed accordingly (Clément, & Droit-Volet, 2006). Grondin, 
Meilleur-Wells and Lachance (1999) determined the interval length of 1.18 
seconds at which the explicit counting becomes a helpful strategy in a temporal 
discrimination task. Indeed, when the subjects use self-paced chronometric 
counting, temporal accuracy tends to be higher (Kladopoulos, Hemmes, & 
Brown, 2004; Rakitin, Gibbon, Penney, Malapani et al., 1998; Wearden, 1991). 
Of course, explicit counting in timing tasks is prevented with a suppression 
task, for example, the use of nonsense speech during timing (Droit-Volet, 




working memory studies to restrict sub-vocal rehearsal (Baddeley, Gathercole, 
& Papagno, 1998).  
In relation to the SET model, the aforementioned methodological aspects 
should be taken into consideration. SET has been previously found to fit the 
data in prospective timing studies, with intervals in a range of seconds and 
restrictions on the use of counting (Wearden, 1991). However, the “classical” 
timing tasks (i.e., interval production, reproduction, verbal estimation) used in 
human time perception research often violate the scalar properties (Wearden, 
2003; Wearden & Lejeune, 2008). In addition, the use of chronometric counting 
has been shown to produce transgressions from scalar properties (Wearden, 
1991). The latter violation of scalar properties might reside in different neural 
systems used in timing and counting (Hinton et al., 2004). 
Finally, the interpretation of results reporting overestimation and 
underestimation or changes in the clock speed should consider differences in the 
methodologies of time perception studies. The pacemaker measures a duration 
of an event in pulses and as a result, a behavioural output is observed (i.e., a 
response of reporting the perceived time). The latter varies as a function of the 
pacemaker rate (Pande & Pati, 2010). Hence, when the internal clock is fast and 
emits more pulses for each “unit” of real time, duration is perceived to be 
longer. This occurs due to the perception of real time passing more slowly 
compared to the faster ticking of the internal clock. Of course, in an interval 
production task, this effect would result in underproduction (i.e., “ticks” are 
accumulated faster and the production of an interval is terminated earlier), 
whereas in a verbal estimation task, overestimation is observed (i.e., more 
“ticks” are accumulated during the time to be judged and the interval is 
estimated to last longer). 
Work presented in the current thesis focuses on interval timing in the range 
of seconds and assumes a cognitively controlled timing mechanism. 
Performance in both prospective (i.e., interval production task, Study I, Study 
II, Study III) and retrospective (Study II, Study IV) time estimation is 
observed. In addition, Study II further examines the relationship between the 
two types of time estimation tasks, showing that a shorter retrospective time 
judgment is related to higher accuracy in the interval production task.  
 
 
2.2 The role of arousal in time perception  
For some time, arousal effects on temporal processing were explored by 
manipulating body temperature and linking changes in temperature to changes 
in psychological time (for a review, see Wearden & Penton-Voak, 1995). 
Hoagland’s (1933) early proposition of a relationship between a chemical 
reaction and temperature, which refers to the existence of a biological basis for 
the subjective time scale, was later termed as arousal-sensitivity by Michel 





time mechanism mediated by the level of arousal – a higher body temperature 
indicates an increase in the arousal level and this in turn has an effect on the 
processing of temporal information by speeding up the clock (Aschoff, 1998; 
Hancock, 1993). However, body temperature is not the only means to 
manipulate the speed of the clock in terms of arousal changes. For example, 
Treisman, Faulkner, Naish and Brogan (1990) elegantly demonstrated an 
increase in clock speed by applying trains of repetitive stimulation (i.e., 
rhythmic flashes or clicks) and concluded that there are possible oscillatory 
processes affected by the rhythm imposed, and the frequency of such a temporal 
oscillator produces the respective temporal estimates. Penton-Voak and 
colleagues (1996) demonstrated in a series of experiments that preceding 
stimuli by clicks increased clock speed by 10%. Additionally, as more pulses 
are generated by the pacemaker due to higher arousal level, counting at the rate 
of subjective second may become faster as well (Hoagland, 1933; Zakay & 
Block, 1997). This effect is explained by the alteration of the basic count unit as 
a result of changes in the speed of an internal clock (Wearden & Penton-Voak, 
1995). Wearden, Philpott and Win (1999) used click-trains to produce a relative 
slowing down of the internal clock in the bisection task, either by applying 
clicks before standards or comparisons. Moreover, absolute slowing of the 
internal clock together with a decrease in self-rated arousal has been achieved 
with the subjectively slow trial pace in the timing task (Wearden, 2008). The 
results in these studies are interpreted in the framework of the arousal-sensitive 
pacemaker (Figure 1).  
Altogether, physiological arousal seems to distort subjective time by 
changing the speed of the internal clock. Using this theoretical context, Studies 
I and II further elaborate on the traditional approach of temperature 
manipulation in time perception by including extensive measures of 
physiological and psychological states. Core temperature, heart rate, hormone 
response and subjective feelings of fatigue and effort are assumed to reflect 
different aspects of arousal. Changes in these state-dependent variables are 
obtained by exercise-heat stress – heat production in the body is increased by 
strenuous exercise and when combined with increased environmental 
temperature, cardiovascular, neuromuscular and thermoregulatory processes are 
altered (Hargreaves, 2008). As core temperature increases, exercise per-
formance shows signs of decline. Increase in body temperature appears to be the 
important factor inducing changes in the hormone response to moderate 
exercise in the heat. The rise in core temperature has been linked to a rise in 
plasma prolactin levels (Burk, Timpmann, Kreegipuu, Tamm et al., 2012; Low, 
Cable, & Purvis, 2005; Pitsiladis, Strachan, Davidson, & Maughan, 2002), 
growth hormone response (Bridge, Weller, Rayson, & Jones, 2003; Christensen, 
Jorgensen, Moller & Orskov, 1984), and to a modulation of cortisol response 
(Brenner, Zamecnik, Shek, & Shephard, 1997; Bridge et al., 2003). Of course, 




emerges due to feelings of distress and discomfort during exercise in the heat 
(Follenius, Brandenberger, Oyono, & Candas, 1982).  
Although changes in core temperature are the main predictor of the exercise 
capacity and the development of fatigue at extremely high ambient temperature, 
increase in energy metabolism (Parkin, Carey, Zhao, & Febbraio, 1999), 
cardiovascular strain accompanied by dehydration (González-Alonso, Mora-
Rodriguez, Below, & Coyle, 1997) and reduction of motor drive in the central 
nervous system (CNS) are also significant in determining exercise performance 
(Nybo & Nielsen, 2001b). Previously described alterations in peripheral 
mechanisms are insufficient to explain the decline in performance (Noakes, 
2000). Exercise increases the metabolic rate in various organs of the body (e.g., 
heart, respiratory system) and especially in active muscle tissue, which is used 
as an afferent input in addition to the input from the active brain regions. 
Information from these signals is integrated in the CNS and modulates the 
motor command in the motor cortex, which is perceived as effort (Kayser, 
2003). The CNS serves as an integration centre of both external and internal 
sensory information and provides feedback for subsequent behaviour regulation. 
Therefore, changes in CNS functioning might be relevant in explaining the 
effects of exercise in the heat, where the rise in core temperature becomes the 
crucial peripheral factor (Nybo & Nielsen, 2001a). Even before the critical level 
of temperature is obtained and the subjects terminate their exercise at the level 
of exhaustion, decrements in exercise performance are often observed, resulting 
from a complex interplay between peripheral and central mechanisms 
(Galloway & Maughan, 1997). 
Taken together, there are several physiological changes in addition to a rise 
in core temperature that are related to the prolonged exercise in hot 
environment. Study I makes a distinction between physiological and 
psychological state-dependent effects on time perception and Study II further 
probes these differences with the heat acclimation effects and hormone response 
to exercise-heat stress.  
 
 
2.3 The role of attention in time perception  
In addition to body temperature, experiments show that the subjective 
experience of time can be affected by various other physiological and 
psychological states like emotions and mood (Angrilli, Cherubini, Pavese, & 
Manfredini, 1997; Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007), boredom (Danckert & Allman, 
2005; Watt, 1991), physical exercise (Lambourne, 2012; Vercruyssen, Hancock, 
& Mihaly, 1989), walking rhythm (Kiefer, Riley, Shockley, Villard et al., 
2009), cognitive task load (Block, Hancock, & Zackay, 2010), and sleep 
deprivation (Esposito, Natale, Martoni, Occhionero et al., 2007; Miró, Cano, 
Espinosa-Fernandez, & Buela-Casal, 2003). For interpreting the obtained 




link previously described has often been found to be inconclusive. Therefore, 
current time perception research presents a remarkable increase in exploring the 
role of attention to explain these effects. 
Incorporating attention into the SET model is one of the challenges in time 
perception research (Wearden & Lejeune, 2008). This is difficult for several 
reasons. First, it should be considered that the origins of the SET model are in 
animal learning and in that context, the timing process is approached in a more 
“bottom-up” manner, assuming a direct link between stimulus and response 
production. However, the premise of attention exhibiting a role in time 
perception suggests the involvement of more “top-down” processes. Ample 
research has already provided support for the crucial role of attention in time 
perception (Brown, 2008; 2010; Brown & Boltz, 2002; Buhusi & Meck, 2009), 
which has proved to be effective in explaining timing behaviour where the 
accounts using the arousal-pacemaker link fail.  
When describing the role of attention in time perception, the “watched pot 
never boils” phenomenon might be a useful example. According to the 
attentional models of time perception, experiencing and processing time 
depends on a subject dividing attention between temporal and non-temporal 
information (Block & Zakay, 1997; Zakay & Block, 1996). More specifically, 
when a subject attends to time, it is perceived to pass slowly, whereas when 
engaged in some other activity, time feels like it is “flying by”. Of course, there 
are exceptions in that matter but these aspects are discussed later in the text 
regarding time estimation in emotional context. The differences in the judgment 
of time in relation to attention occur as a result of resource allocation between 
temporal and non-temporal information processing. Within the SET framework, 
attention effects could be explained by the functioning of the switch between a 
pacemaker and the accumulator (Figure 1). When attention is directed to time, 
the switch is closed and the pulses flow to the accumulator. However, when 
something else catches our attention and we get distracted from the temporal 
properties of the task, the switch is opened and the flow of pulses to the 
accumulator is terminated. Block and Zakay (1996) have specified the approach 
on how attention influences the internal clock by introducing the attentional 
gate model. It bears great similarity to the attention effects on the switch (as 
explained by the SET) but allows a more “flexible” account of the mechanism. 
Here, a gate is placed between the pacemaker and the accumulator. More 
attention to time results in a wider gate, allowing more pulses to be accumulated 
and thus, the perceived time is lengthened. The pulses in the clock system may 
get lost, which would be an indicator of a “flickering” switch as a result of 
disturbed attentional processing (Meck & Benson, 2002). Directing attention to 
time is one of the sources of variability in time perception, most likely 
controlling the switch (or the gate) and directly affecting the pulse count in the 
accumulator (Coull, Vidal, Nazarian, & Macar, 2004; Lejeune, 1998; Macar, 




The role of attention in time perception is especially obvious in prospective 
judgments, where a person knows in advance about the temporal requirements 
of the task. For successful timing performance, the subject would direct 
attention towards temporal cues and, if permitted, use chronometric counting. 
Higher temporal awareness is generally accompanied by more accurate timing 
behaviour. In a retrospective paradigm, due to being unaware of the timing 
requirements, attention is more captured by non-temporal information (Brown, 
2010). When considering the two paradigms, Brown and Stubbs (1992) 
proposed to observe the differences (or similarities) by assigning the degree of 
attentiveness to the time in a task. Thus, the two types of timing are really 
situated on the same continuum and the differences are explained by the level of 
attention to temporal properties in the task. 
Additional evidence for the involvement of attention processes in time 
perception comes from the research applying the dual-task paradigm. When less 
attention is allocated to time, for example, by engaging in a concurrent task and 
distracting the temporal aspect with other task demands, a reduction in 
subjective duration occurs. Also, temporal accuracy is reduced as judgments 
become more variable. As already mentioned, if more attention is allocated to 
time and processing of temporal cues, the perceived duration is more accurate 
(Brown, 2008; Brown & Merchant, 2007; Buhusi & Meck, 2009). These effects 
are explained by the two simultaneous tasks competing for the limited pool of 
attentional resources, and time perception depends on how much attention the 
temporal aspects of the task receive. Dual-task studies have revealed that 
temporal behaviour is remarkably sensitive to interference and processing 
demands, as even the smallest demands might impair temporal performance 
(Brown, 2010). In addition, the nature of interference and the conformity 
between the distractor and the stimuli to be timed has proved to be inconclusive. 
Rather, the general aspect of disrupting attention is responsible for deteriorated 
temporal performance (Brown, 2008). Research showing bidirectional effects of 
interference has proposed a question about the availability of multiple resources 
(Brown, 2010). Indeed, several studies have provided evidence that the tasks 
related to executive functioning might share resources used by temporal 
processes, demonstrating a reciprocal trade-off between the tasks (Brown, 1997; 
Brown, Collier, & Night, 2013). However, it should be noted that processing 
and timing of more complex stimuli (e.g., emotional pictures) could introduce 
specific attention effects (Lui, Penney, & Schirmer, 2011; Schirmer, 2011), 
which will be discussed in later chapters. 
In relation to attention mechanisms, a distinction between automatic and 
controlled processes becomes important; hence the concept of “top-down” 
processing should be introduced. The common notion is that automatic tasks 
require less attention and cause less interference with other concurrent 
activities, whereas controlled or executive processes require intentional 
approach (for a review, see Lustig, 2003). Of course, under complex and 





more difficult – automatic processes might require more processing resources 
and the cognitively controlled processing is therefore significantly impaired 
(Cian, Barraud, Melin, & Raphel, 2001; Cian, Koulmann, Barraud, Jimenez et 
al., 2000; Dietrich & Audiffren, 2011; Tomporowski, 2003). Thus, in the case 
of an overwhelming fatigue or exertion, or due to concurrent task demands, less 
accurate temporal performance with relatively longer productions and shorter 
estimations is expected. Furthermore, intervals in a multi-second range require 
the use of the cognitively mediated temporal system as the subject is able to use 
a certain segmenting strategy to divide temporal intervals into smaller units 
(Hellström & Rammsayer, 2004; Rammsayer, 2008).  
Because of the possible role of attention in time perception, Study III takes 
advantage of the affective attention paradigm, assuming the preferential 
processing of emotional information in the brain. As the perceptual capacity to 
process information is somewhat limited, attention selects the relevant 
information that is subjected to further processing and priority is given to 
emotionally salient or goal-relevant stimuli (Pourtois et al., 2013). Information 
selected by attention involves both stimulus driven (bottom-up, exogenous) and 
goal-driven (top-down, endogenous) factors. A task-irrelevant stimulus with 
distinctive physical features that can be novel or unexpected might gain 
preferential processing among other stimuli and conversely an otherwise 
unobtrusive stimulus might be preferred because of its importance within the 
current goals and expectations (Posner, 1980; Theeuwes, 1994). These 
attentional processes are not exclusive and do not operate independently and, 
although stimulus-driven attention is mostly reflexive, top-down factors related 
to task-relevant goals might influence the former processes. These two attention 
mechanisms are involved with different brain circuits in the frontal and parietal 
cortex but also show functional and structural overlap (Corbetta & Schulman, 
2002).  
The main function of attention mechanisms is to amplify sensory processing 
of stimuli, which, when presented simultaneously, compete for the processing 
resources in order to access awareness through higher cognitive processing 
(Pourtois et al., 2013; Vuilleumier, 2005). Emotional stimuli have the ability to 
engage neural systems relative to neutral stimuli and through attentional 
processes the former gains additional weight for further processing (Corbetta & 
Schulman, 2002). Enhanced sensory processing for emotional stimuli is 
observed on various occasions. The neural response to emotional stimuli is 
enhanced relative to neutral stimuli with additional specific dynamics in 
temporal processing. The emotional information elicits earlier responses in 
certain frontoparietal areas, which affect the following sensory and cognitive 
processing (Pourtois, Spinelli, Seeck, & Vuilleumier, 2010). It is possible that 
the gain control mechanisms of affective attention might explain how emotions 
modulate time perception. If emotional and temporal information compete for 
the capture of attention, attention is diverted faster and more strongly towards 




course, the effects of emotional attention might be dependent on current 
emotional context and the emotional state of the subject (e.g., enhanced sensory 
response by anxiety, Cornwell, Alvarez, Lissek, Kaplan et al., 2011).  
Taken together, emotional stimuli have the ability to influence the ongoing 
sensory processing through stimulus-driven as well as task-relevant 
mechanisms more efficiently than neutral stimuli. Perception and attention 
processes are not just dependent on the modulation of top-down resources but 
emerge from the competitive processes among different factors to attain 
selection of relevant information (Pourtois et al., 2013). Of course, different 
emotional stimuli might elicit distinct patterns of activation and attentional 
capture, which might explain the differences in estimating time and further 
unravel the attention mechanism in the SET framework.  
 
 
2.4 Time perception in the brain 
Although as noted by Gibbon and Malapani (2001) that “current understanding 
of the psychophysics of temporal processing far exceeds our understanding of 
the neural substrates of timing”, recent advances to specify brain systems 
involved in time perception have been noteworthy. To identify whether humans 
actually possess a biological clock-like mechanism and how a duration is 
represented in the brain, recent developments have linked the SET framework 
and behavioural data to psychophysiological processes (Buhusi & Meck, 2005; 
Coull et al., 2011; Grondin, 2010; Livesey, Wall, & Smith, 2007; Wittmann, 
2009). Recent evidence suggests that there is a specialized brain system 
involved in temporal behaviour. When the neural origins of timing mechanisms 
are considered, it is important to differentiate between perceptual and motor 
timing processes and also explicit and implicit timing (Coull et al., 2011; Coull 
& Nobre, 2008). In the explicit timing tasks, subjects generally provide an overt 
estimate of certain durations, whereas implicit timing tasks require making 
temporal predictions based on the regularity of the temporal pattern (Coull & 
Nobre, 2008). Temporal predictability is achieved through temporal sensory 
cues and also through subjective sense of temporal expectations, which have 
been shown to improve performance related to non-temporal task goals (Barnes 
& Jones, 2000; Coull & Nobre, 1998).  
Specific brain structures often implicated in temporal processing are the 
cerebellum and the basal ganglia (Allan, 1998; Coull et al., 2004). The 
cerebellum is proposed to be involved in both time perception and in the timing 
of movement (Ivry & Hazeltine, 1995; Ivry & Keele, 1989). There is still a 
debate whether the cerebellum is involved in the timing of brief intervals (i.e., 
milliseconds range, Bueti, Walsh, Frith, & Rees, 2008; Lewis & Miall, 2003b) 
or is rather related to the processing of intervals in the seconds range 
(Harrington, Lee, Boyd, Rapcsak et al., 2004; Nichelli, Alway, & Grafman, 




(TMS) showed that repetitive TMS to the cerebellum impairs timing of sub-
second durations (Koch, Oliveri, Torriero, Salerno et al., 2007). The basal 
ganglia have been found to be relevant for the encoding of temporal stimuli and 
determine the speed of the pacemaker (Harrington & Haaland, 1999; Malapani, 
Deweer, & Gibbon, 2002). More recent evidence from functional neuroimaging 
has shown the basal ganglia activity to be independent of duration range 
(Jahanshahi, Jones, Dirnberger, & Frith, 2006) and sensory modality (Shih, 
Kuo, Yeh, Tseng et al., 2009) during timing. These results implicate the basal 
ganglia as a possible centralised timer with context-independent properties, 
although they are often related to the activity of various cortical regions (Coull 
et al., 2011). With respect to co-activation patterns in the brain, the basal 
ganglia and the supplementary motor area (SMA), which are responsible for the 
control of motor processes in general, are suggested to have a central role in 
motor timing processes (Jantzen, Oullier, Marshall, Steinberg et al., 2007). 
However, the basal ganglia are activated alone when the duration is produced 
based on the internally specified representation (Garraux, McKinney, Wu, 
Kansaku et al., 2005). The role of the SMA in timing tasks have been described 
for shorter (Ferrandez, Hugueville, Lehericy, Poline et al., 2003) and longer 
intervals (Rao, Mayer, & Harrington, 2001) as well as for chronometric 
counting (Hinton et al., 2004). Therefore, when considering a typical time 
estimation task, both external (e.g., providing a motor response) and internal 
representations (i.e., perceptual processing) are required for successful 
performance and thus, the SMA and the basal ganglia are both activated.  
In addition, several cortical regions like frontal and parietal cortices have 
been implicated in the processing of temporal information (Coull, Frackowiak, 
& Frith, 1998; Lewis & Miall, 2006; Macar & Vidal, 2009). In particular, TMS 
(Koch et al., 2007) and neuropsychological evidence (Danckert, Ferber, Pun, 
Broderick et al., 2007) show the role of the right prefrontal cortex in the 
temporal processing of longer supra-second durations. The same region has 
been shown to be involved in making temporal predictions due to its monitoring 
role and using sensory input for updating temporal expectations (Vallesi, 
Shallice, & Walsh, 2007). Updating temporal information is also involved in 
explicit timing, especially during the passing of the temporal interval. A 
constant comparison process of the currently lapsing time and reference 
memory representation is assumed to involve prefrontal cortical activity and 
reflect the accumulation of temporal pulses (Coull et al., 2011).  
Pharmacological manipulations in animals indicate that the speed of the 
pacemaker is presumably modulated by the dopamine (DA) system (Matell, 
King, & Meck, 2004; Meck, 1983; 1986; Rammsayer, 1993; Rammsayer & 
Vogel, 1992). Dopaminergic drugs selectively affect the speed of an internal 
clock – DA antagonists (e.g., haloperidol) produce a deceleration in the rate of 
the pacemaker whereas administration of DA agonists methamphetamine and 
cocaine elicit a contrary effect, indicative of an increased rate of the pacemaker 




Timing of brief intervals in the millisecond range is controlled by the dopamine 
activity in the basal ganglia and the behavioural effects are not dependent on the 
increased availability of DA in the brain but more related to the DA receptor 
activity (Rammsayer, 1993; 2009). The D2 receptor has been suggested to be the 
mediator of the pharmacological effects described (MacDonald & Meck, 2006). 
These proportional effects were explained by the proposal that dopaminergic 
agonists increase the speed of the pacemaker in a way that the perceived time 
(i.e. the output of the clock stage) grows more rapidly than the real time (Meck, 
1983; 1986). For example, if the speed of the internal clock actually doubled, 
subjects would provide a temporal response 50% earlier, irrespective of the 
duration being timed.  
Nonetheless, several neuropharmacological studies on temporal processing 
in humans indicate a somewhat complex picture and this is possibly related to 
the cognitive mediation of time perception. Lewis and Miall (2006) strongly 
advocate for the important role of DA projections into the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), an area involved in both working memory and 
timing process. Pharmacological manipulations targeting working memory 
processes are responsible for impaired timing of intervals in the range of 
seconds (Rammsayer, 1999). While dopaminergic drugs selectively affect the 
speed of the internal clock, the cholinergic system has been proposed to affect 
the memory processes involved in timing (Meck, 1983; 1996). Rammsayer 
(2009) concluded that any pharmacological intervention that affects working 
memory and attention, irrespective of the neurotransmitter system, modulates 
the estimation of longer intervals.  
Taken together, there is still a lively debate as to whether there is a neural 
timer in the brain that is central to all timing-related performance or, rather, the 
timing behaviour is a distributed pattern of neural activity in functionally 
specific areas in the brain. Indeed, there are modality differences in timing 
(Bueti, Bahrami, & Walsh, 2008) and duration-specific patterns of activity 
(Matell & Meck, 2004), but these generally involve timing of durations in a 
millisecond range. The distinction between perceptual timing and motor timing 
should be considered when various tasks are applied to explore the temporal 
processing in the brain. Several components of the internal clock model are 
involved in estimating longer durations (e.g., attention, working-memory, 
decision making), which includes extensive perceptual discrimination but also, 
depending on the task, providing a motor response (e.g., a button press to 
produce temporal intervals). Thus, neuroscientific evidence supports the idea of 
two distinct timing circuits in the brain (Buhusi & Meck, 2002) – an automatic 
timing system for the millisecond range, involving the cerebellum and a 
cognitively controlled timing circuit, which requires attention and working 
memory, and involves cortical regions together with the basal ganglia.  
The experimental design applied in Study I and Study II provides an 
opportunity to suggest possible brain mechanisms involved in time production. 





peripheral hormone response provide indirect evidence about the brain 
mechanisms and neurotransmitter activity related to experiencing exercise-heat 
stress. Recent studies implicate the role of the DA and noradrenaline (NA) 
systems in regulating core temperature in the brain during prolonged exercise in 
the heat (Roelands & Meeusen, 2010). Administration of a dual DA reuptake 
inhibitor improved exercise performance in high ambient temperature 
conditions and the subjects were able to maintain the level of arousal after 
attaining critical core temperature (Roelands, Hasegawa, Watson, Piacentini et 
al., 2008). Although core temperature and heart rate had risen significantly 
compared to the placebo condition, the subjects did not report higher perceived 
thermal stress or effort, indicating the role of DA in dampening the conscious 
response to heat stress. The prolactin response during prolonged exercise in the 
heat is often considered to be an indicator of the CNS functioning as it is 
stimulated by serotonergic (5-HT) activity and inhibited by DA (Bridge et al., 
2003; Wright, Selkirk, Rhind, & McLellan, 2012) along with a strong link to 
changes in core temperature (Pitsiladis et al., 2002). Although increased levels 
of 5-HT are related to the feelings of fatigue and decreases in arousal, its exact 
role in thermoregulation and exercise performance is yet to be determined 
(Roelands & Meeusen, 2010). In addition to linking 5-HT and DA activity with 
the development of central fatigue (Davies & Bailey, 1997; Roelands & 
Meeusen, 2010) and control of thermoregulation (Hasegawa, Yazawa, 
Yasumatsu, Otokawa et al., 2000; Lee, Mora, & Myers, 1985), the involvement 
of DA neurotransmission in regulating motor drive and motivational processes 
support its role in changes in mood and affective behaviour (Ashby, Isen, & 
Turken, 1999; Rubinsztein, Rogers, Riedel, Mehta et al., 2001).  
The previously described peripheral and central changes during exercise-
heat stress might result from the various stages of the pathway between the CNS 
and the musculoskeletal system (Nybo & Nielsen, 2001b). For example, 
perceived exertion is related to an altered EEG response in the frontal cortex 
during prolonged exercise in the heat, rather than to muscle activity (Nybo & 
Nielsen, 2001a). The dynamics in the frontal EEG high frequency β band have 
been shown to initially increase with transition from the resting state to exercise 
and then follow a progressive decline – a process accompanied by a gradual 
increase in core temperature (Nielsen, Hyldig, Bidstrup, González-Alonso et al., 
2001). These alterations in frontal cortical activity presumably reflect changes 
in the general arousal level of the CNS and in the metabolic activity in focal 
brain regions. For example, Cheung and Sleivert (2004) suggest an important 
role of competition between the thermoregulatory and metabolic demands. 
Indeed, cerebral blood flow shows a gradual decrease during prolonged exercise 
in the heat but this does not indicate a similar decrease in cerebral metabolism 
(Nybo, Moller, Volianitis, Nielsen et al., 2002). For example, the rise in core 
temperature increased cerebral metabolic rate in the hypothalamus, the 
thalamus, the (lateral) cerebellum, the cingulate gyrus and the corpus callosum 




insula and the posterior cingulum (Nunneley, Martin, Slauson, Hearon et al., 
2002). Note that the cerebellum and the basal ganglia have been previously 
implicated in temporal processing (Coull et al., 2011). Hence, the feelings of 
fatigue, arousal and central drive, and also time perception might share common 
neural mechanisms that become important during temperature manipulation. 
 
 
2.5 Aims and hypotheses 
The aim of this thesis is to explain the mechanisms responsible for changes in 
perceived time. Arousal and attention processes are further probed with 
temperature manipulations and processing of emotional stimuli to gain a better 
understanding of time perception. Taking into consideration the amount of 
research on these mechanisms in different contexts of temporal processing, 
there is still little knowledge about the way how these mechanisms together 
contribute to interval production. Changes in arousal elicit changes in the speed 
of the internal clock by modulating the rate at which the pacemaker emits pulses 
(Gibbon et al., 1984; Treisman, 1963). Body temperature (Wearden & Penton-
Voak, 1995) and timing of emotional stimuli (Droit-Volet & Gil, 2009; 
Schirmer, 2011) are proposed to be responsible for these changes. Although 
both factors are assumed to act through the arousal-pacemaker mechanism, the 
complex pattern of results in different time perception tasks introduces 
additional interpretations, with the plausible involvment of the attention-switch 
mechanism and the interaction between the two proposed mechanisms.  
The temperature sensitive changes in the speed of the pacemaker have been 
traditionally explained by physiological changes. More specifically, a rise in 
body temperature increases the speed of the pacemaker resulting in subjective 
lengthening of time and conversely, decreasing the body temperature 
decelerates the internal clock (Wearden & Penton-Voak, 1995). Study I and 
Study II support the dissociation of different facets of arousal, as the absence of 
direct temperature effect suggests the significant role of psychological factors 
(i.e., perceived fatigue, Studies I and II) and hormone response (Study II) to 
exercise-heat stress. In addition, Study II implicates the role of attention in time 
perception as retrospective and prospective timing performance is closely 
related. Subjects who were able to concentrate on a non-temporal task demands 
(i.e., underestimating time retrospectively) were also more accurate in 
producing temporal intervals in stressful conditions. Thus, they were more 
effectively directing attention to task-relevant goals in both time perception 
tasks – towards temporal information in the interval production task and non-
temporal information in the retrospective time estimation task. The role of 
attention in time perception is further explored in Study III with emotional 
stimuli. Here, a rather novel approach to study emotional time perception by 
adopting widely recognised event-related potentials (ERPs) of the affective 




paradigm of affective attention is applied to study time perception with ERP 
correlates, which differentiate the emotion-induced early attentional processing 
and subsequent arousal processes. In the SET model, emotion effects on time 
perception are assumed to operate through the arousal mechanism and modulate 
the rate of the pacemaker (Droit-Volet & Gil, 2009). The results in Study III 
revealed the valence-specificity of producing durations filled by affective 
stimuli, referring to the involvement of an attentional mechanism in emotional 
time perception. Although time perception is state-dependent and altered by 
changes in physiological and psychological factors as demonstrated by Studies 
I–III, individual differences in certain predispositions determine the way 
temporal information is processed. For example, impulsive individuals over-
estimate time, which in turn affects their decision making behaviour, 
particularly in behavioural impulsivity tasks (Wittmann & Paulus, 2008). Study 
IV assessed the impulsivity of the subjects with self-reported measures and 
performance in a stop-signal task (SST), reflecting response inhibition. 
Individuals with higher Thoughtlessness score and behavioural response in SST 
referring to higher levels of impulsivity, made longer retrospective time 
judgements. These results can be interpreted from several perspectives. First, 
impulsive individuals might possess a faster cognitive tempo (i.e., higher speed 
of the internal clock) and therefore exhibit altered sense of time. On the other 
hand, the findings suggest the involvement of attention mechanisms as 
impulsive individuals might have trouble allocating attention to relevant non-
temporal information. The affective response of impulsive individuals is 
considered in relation to the attention mechanism to explain the overestimation 
of time.  
The general aim of the current thesis is to specify the factors that modulate 
the perception of time and clarify the role of arousal and attention processes 
within the theoretical framework of the internal clock. The results from the 
presented four studies clearly show that the arousal-pacemaker link and 
attention mechanism independently do not provide sufficient interpretation for 
the current findings. Rather, if interval timing is a cognitively mediated process, 
the arousal-related and attention-related mechanisms are not necessarily 
operating exclusively, but might contribute to alterations in subjective time in 
an additive or interactive way. That said, Schirmer (2011) has proposed a 
hybrid model for affective time perception, which integrates the concepts of 
arousal and attention from the SET model within the interoceptive framework 
(Craig, 2002; 2008; 2009b) to explain temporal behaviour. More specifically, 
assuming emotional modulation of time perception, the stimulus-specific 
sentient representations (i.e., being aware of one’s self) explain various changes 
in subjective time, which often do not follow a classical arousal-pacemaker or 
attention-switch approach. Current findings suggest that the temperature 






3 TIME PERCEPTION UNDER  
EXERCISE-HEAT STRESS 
Raising or lowering body temperature alters the perception of time, indicating 
the existence of a temperature-sensitive internal clock (Wearden & Penton-
Voak, 1995). The rate of subjective time tends to increase with a respective 
increase in body temperature (François, 1927; Hoagland, 1933) and decreases 
when body temperature is reduced (Baddeley, 1966; Bell, 1975). Generally, the 
former effect is found and with higher temperature shorter subjective durations 
are produced. These effects are explained by temperature-increased arousal as 
physiological processes in the body affecting the speed of the internal 
pacemaker. However, contrary effects have also been found with cold stress 
increasing the rate of subjective time (Fox, Bradbury, & Hampton, 1967; 
Lockhart, 1967). These equivocal results speak against a simple relationship 
between temperature and time perception within the SET framework. Hancock 
(1993) sensibly comments that previous research has not distinguished 
temperature effects from the experienced distress resulting from being exposed 
to extreme conditions. Of course, changes in core temperature are crucial in 
eliciting physiological alterations, in both direct and indirect manner. However, 
the question remains how these effects are related to a psychological response 
and whether the effects of exercise-heat stress on cognitive functioning could be 
explained similarly to exercise performance. If we consider time perception to 
be a cognitively mediated process, both physiological changes and psycho-
logical factors might have a role in the timing performance. Studies I and II 
dissect the arousal mechanism of the internal clock and elaborate how 
temperature manipulations change time perception. 
 
 
3.1 Affective response and cognitive performance 
during prolonged exercise at high ambient 
temperature  
The overview in the previous chapter introduced a general understanding 
concerning the physiological effects of prolonged exercise in warm 
environments. Indeed, the changes in cardiovascular, neuromuscular, thermo-
regulatory and hormone response have been extensively studied (Hargreaves, 
2008) with some of the process dynamics better understood than others. 
However, heat stress exhibits adverse effects on cognitive functioning with 
prolonged or high intensity exercise being an additional stress-inducing factor 
(Hancock & Vasmatzidis, 2003). From exercise studies, perceived exertion is 
the most often reported psychological factor affected but the mental 
performance extends beyond the sense of effort. To further complicate matters, 





different classifications of cognitive processes make the interpretation of effects 
difficult. As various aspects of cognitive processes exhibit differences in the 
sensitivity to thermal conditions, the exact underlying mechanisms involved are 
still in need of much clarification.  
Task complexity has been identified as a primary factor in explaining the 
effects of heat stress on cognitive functioning (Hancock & Vasmatzidis, 2003). 
Simple tasks of more automatic nature are less sensitive to heat stress compared 
to more demanding tasks, which require sustained attention and working-
memory (Gaoua, Grantham, El Massioui, Girard et al., 2011; Gaoua, Racinais, 
Grantham, & El Massioui, 2011). Core temperature is suggested to be the main 
factor contributing to impairments in cognitive functioning, specifically, the rate 
of change in the respective variable is important (Hancock & Vasmatzidis, 
2003; Razmjou & Kjellberg, 1992). However, these changes in cognitive 
processes cannot be exclusively explained by the core temperature changes, as 
the decrements in performance have been observed already within half an hour 
of heat exposure without a significant rise in core temperature (Gaoua, 
Grantham, Racinais, & El Massioui, 2012; Ramsey & Kwon, 1992). An 
increase in skin temperature has been shown to be a reliable predictor of a 
decrease in cognitive performance and the sensitivity of these processes has 
been related to the environmental temperature per se rather than to the 
physiological response (Hancock & Vasmatzidis, 2003). Changes in skin 
temperature are proposed to reflect sensory displeasure in the hot environment 
with subjects reporting more negative feelings, which in addition are related to 
disturbances in cognitive functioning (Gaoua et al., 2012).  
In regards to both exercise performance and cognitive functioning, affective 
response in extreme environments should be considered as an important 
mediating factor. Exercise in extreme environments, whether it is cold, heat or 
altitude, imposes psychological stress in addition to physiological alterations 
(Acevedo & Ekkekakis, 2001; Lane, Terry, Stevens, Barney et al., 2004). 
Affective response has been suggested to be more sensitive to environmental 
change (Bahrke & Shukitt-Hale, 1993; Lane et al., 2004) and the psychological 
processes are thus influenced earlier by the respective changes compared to 
physiological functioning (Kobrick & Johnson, 1991). Performance in the hot 
environment is related to various mood states (Ekkekakis, Parfitt, & Petruzzello, 
2011) and psychological state might be involved in mediating the negative 
physiological effects (e.g., reappraisal of higher levels of heart rate, Cheung, 
2010). Both exercise and cognitive performance in warm environments are 
affected by the interplay between physiological changes to thermal stimuli and 
psychological input related to conscious perception of the environment and 
bodily changes. Acevedo and Ekkekakis (2001) have proposed a psycho-
biological model to explain the significance of cognitive appraisal during 
exercise in extreme conditions. According to this model, the perceived 
capability to handle the demands imposed by exercise-heat stress influences the 




(RPE, Borg, 1998) has proven to be a useful measure to observe psychological 
response to physiological variables. The RPE is proposed to receive both central 
(sensations from the cardiorespiratory system) and local (e.g., exercising 
muscles) input (Pandolf, 1978; Robertson, Gillespie, McCarthy, & Rose, 1979). 
Moreover, psychological factors are suggested to explain about 30% of the 
variance in the RPE (Morgan, 1973) and personality factors with previous 
experience and emotional predispositions contributing as well (Rejeski, 1985). 
The relative contribution of these factors is dependent on exercise intensity 
(Acevedo, Rinehardt, & Kraemer, 1994; Noble & Robertson, 1996) and 
duration (Acevedo, Gill, Goldfarb, & Boyer, 1996) – in case of exercise at high 
intensity and for a long duration more attention is directed towards 
physiological sensation. In reference to the physiological factors related to heat 
stress, sensory cues of ventilation and heart rate have shown to make a higher 
contribution to the RPE than thermal sensations (Maw, Boutcher, & Taylor, 
1993). Thus, the appraisal of effort is an important observable variable and 
provides information about the dynamic and possibly reciprocal relationship 
between physiological and psychological responses to exercising in 
environmentally stressful conditions. To sum up, several theoretical models 
clearly differentiate central and peripheral factors contributing to both exercise 
performance and cognitive functioning. Physiological changes that occur during 
prolonged exercise in the heat are not sufficient to explain the subsequent 
changes in cognitive functioning, hence the role of psychological factors and 
affective response to stressful experimental conditions is emphasised. 
A conceptual framework for explaining how both psychological (central) 
and physiological (peripheral) changes during exercise contribute to observed 
performance is provided by the model of interoception (Craig, 2002). The 
proposed model postulates a cortically based subjective awareness, where a 
number of affective representations at each instantaneous moment extend across 
a certain period of time. The changes in these consecutive emotional moments 
in time provide a perspective of a “sentient self”. Hence, there is an internal 
temporal representation, which is subjective and emotionally laden and 
therefore possesses certain flexibility (Craig, 2009a). According to this 
paradigm, the perceived temperature, the level of hydration and muscular pain 
generate a sense of physical self (i.e., physiological condition of the body), 
which is processed in the CNS. More specifically, the sense of homeostatic 
awareness stems from the anterior insular cortex, where the activity is related to 
subjective feelings (e.g., perceived thermal intensity) rather than physiological 
changes observed (Craig, Chen, Bandy, & Reiman, 2000). This cortical 
integration of the physiological state provides a subjective sense of homeostasis, 
which in turn is responsible for the affective response and conscious regulation 
of behaviour. The series of neural representations of homeostatic feelings from 
the body integrates the salience of all moments to generate a “global emotional 
moment” (Craig 2009a), which describes the sentient self at the very instant. Of 




of the past moments and anticipation of future feelings with the present occurs. 
In other words, to obtain a global emotional moment of the present, in addition 
to registering the feelings, the environment and the context in real time, 
previous experience is also important, especially when future expectations 
about global emotional moment are generated (Craig, 2009b). The anterior 
insular cortex is closely connected to the amygdala and the hypothalamus but its 
co-activation with the anterior cingulate cortex is responsible for providing the 
substrate for emotions, motivations, cognitive and behavioural control (Craig, 
2008; Thielscher & Pessoa, 2007). There is some evidence of psychological 
interventions enhancing physiological tolerance to heat, possibly modulating the 
motivational processes (Barwood, Thelwell, & Tipton, 2008). Therefore, the 
psychological state is as important as the physiological changes related to 
exercise-heat stress.  
Marc Wittmann (2013) suggests that the specific climbing neural activity in 
the insular cortex is behind the cortical representation of time, which is 
dependent on emotions and the perceived state of the body. If the temporal 
context of sentient processing is considered, it would be reasonable to assume 
that these processes are linked to the processing of temporal intervals and that 
their neural basis are similar. Indeed, neuroimaging studies have provided 
evidence that the anterior insular cortex is also activated during time estimation 
tasks (Lewis & Miall, 2006). Recently, Kosillo and Smith (2010) showed that 
the the anterior insula is activated during various timing tasks irrespective of 
stimulus modality, suggesting a more general role in the timing process. The 
role of interoception regarding time perception has been investigated by 
Pollatos, Laubrock and Wittmann (2014), who showed that fearful movie clips 
accompanied by interoceptive focus were significantly dilated while feelings of 
amusement made the passage of time quicker. They concluded that a higher 
awareness of bodily sensations results in a more pronounced emotional 
modulation of subjective time. The mechanism behind these effects is proposed 
to be the autonomic reactivity and more precisely, sympathetic salience, which 
is lowered by the positive valence and activated by negative valence (Pollatos et 
al., 2014). More specifically, the subjective passage of time depends on the 
emotional and physiological states processed in the brain and the neural 
representation of time and interoception appear to be closely related. 
Within the internal clock model, the arousal mechanism is commonly 
applied to interpret the relationship between mental performance (e.g., interval 
production) and changes in body temperature (Wearden & Penton-Voak, 1995). 
A unitary arousal theory postulates an inverted-U relationship between the 
performance and the arousal level of the performer (Hebb, 1955; Kahneman, 
1973). According to this, as core temperature rises as a result of prolonged 
exercise in the heat, the arousal level of the subject increases as well, 
accompanied by improved performance. However, at some point performance 
starts to decrease as the temperature further increases (Provins, 1966; 




of criticism, mostly due to the flexible approach to locating the arousal level 
where performance efficiency is observed (Hancock, 1989). Risto Näätänen 
(1973) emphasised the qualitative aspects of arousal, which affect performance. 
According to this, performance efficiency is determined by the optimal level of 
activation required for a specific task – if this optimal level of arousal is altered, 
performance decrements occur. Thus, in the current experimental context, 
exercise-heat stress would disrupt the optimal level of activation required for 
adequate performance in the time production task that would occur in otherwise 
normal conditions.  
Considering the issues with defining arousal in the time-sharing context in 
extreme conditions (Vasmatzidis et al., 2002) and the structural model of 
interoception (Craig, 2009b), the possible involvement of attention processes in 
time perception becomes relevant. It should also be considered that constant 
sentient processing might require additional processing resources. Exercising in 
the heat requires allocation of attentional processes, probably between the 
interval production task and walking on a treadmill. If the affective response is 
considered, additional resources might be needed for regulating the emotional 
experience. When the exercise becomes more resource-demanding as time 
progresses, the remaining resources are directed towards relevant activities like 
exercise performance and maintaining motor control (Dietrich & Audiffren, 
2011). Consequently, as the stress increases, attention towards temporal cues is 
decreased or resources for temporal processing are sparse. This leads to 
erroneous performance in a concurrent cognitive task (e.g., temporal 
discrimination) and greater variability of responses.  
Taken together, exercising in extreme environmental conditions is 
accompanied by consequent experience of stress, which is observed in various 
physiological and psychological changes. The aim of Study I is to disentangle 
the different aspects of response to exercise-heat stress in relation to time 
perception. The concept of a temperature-sensitive internal clock is further 
elaborated and the significant role of psychological factors is considered. In 
Study II, acclimation to heat evokes physiological and psychological 
adaptations, which in turn, are related to performance in the interval production 
task. In addition, hormone response as an indicator of the experienced heat 
stress serves as a possible predictor of temporal processing in extreme 











3.2 Study I “The compression of perceived time  
in a hot environment depends on physiological and 
psychological factors” 
When considering the physiological and psychological implications of heat 
stress and heat acclimation previously described, the concept of arousal needs to 
be specified. Arousal is assumed to affect time perception through the 
pacemaker-accumulator mechanism within the SET framework. This effect is 
assumed to be similar regardless of experimental manipulation to change the 
level of activation. However, it is unreasonable to expect that temperature 
manipulations (Wearden & Penton-Voak, 1995), emotions (Droit-Volet & Gil, 
2009) and stimulation with repetitive sounds (Penton-Voak et al., 1996) or 
flashes (Treisman et al., 1990) influence time perception through a similarly 
“arousing” process. The differences of these experimental manipulations for 
exploring the internal clock mechanisms have been less acknowledged in 
relation to the pacemaker activity. Hoagland’s (1933) view of a chemical clock 
to interpret the temperature effects on temporal judgments needs further 
elaboration.  
The objective of Study I was to detail and refine the concept of arousal and 
its role in influencing the subjective time. The assumption behind the applied 
experimental design was the multidimensionality of arousal, registered by 
various physiological and psychological state-dependent variables. By 
recognising the number of processes affected by exercise-heat stress, different 
facets of arousal were identified. In addition to body temperature and heart rate 
as physiological and somewhat peripheral indicators of arousal, it is possible to 
investigate the activation level of the CNS with the critical flicker frequency, 
indexing the ability to separate very short temporal samples from a continuous 
visual input (CFF, Simonson & Brozek, 1952). Extensive research has 
demonstrated that physiological signs of prolonged exercise in warm 
environments are generally accompanied by psychological changes, more 
precisely, feelings of fatigue and effort (measured by CR-10 and RPE, 
respectively; Borg, 1998), emanating from the subjective experience of physical 
performance and physiological sensations (Acevedo & Ekkekakis, 2001). 
During prolonged exercise in hot environment, the perceived exertion (RPE) 
exhibits a linear increase in relation to the rise in core temperature and heart rate 
(González-Alonso, Teller, Andersen, Jensen et al., 1999). Therefore, it is 
possible to differentiate various state-dependent processes in relation to 
exercise-heat stress and elaborate the concept of arousal relevant to interval 
production. It is somewhat surprising that in previous research concerning 
temperature effects on temporal processing (Wearden & Penton-Voak, 1995), 
psychological factors are rarely if ever considered. Rather, the mechanism 
behind all those changes in temporal processing is assumed to be the arousal 
level of the subject, induced by the changes in metabolic activity, which 




arousal). At the same time, there is extensive research showing that the 
processing of emotional stimuli influences performance in similar tasks 
requiring time judgments (e.g., concept of emotional arousal, Droit-Volet & Gil, 
2009; Schirmer, 2011). Therefore, Study I contributes to time perception 
research by integrating the historical concept of temperature effects and the 
knowledge from recent studies applying the affective stimuli to investigate the 
contribution of psychological state-dependent variables, presumably reflecting 
emotional arousal, on temporal judgments.  
The previous evidence shows that both exercise (Lambourne, 2012; 
Vercruyssen et al., 1989) and passive heating (Hancock, 1984; 1993), similar to 
natural fever (Hoagland, 1933), elicit changes in perceived time. Hence, Study 
I employed an experimental paradigm where these variables were separated. 
This was done in order to observe the distinct effects of temperature as well as 
exercise, and interaction between these variables. A sample of 24 healthy fit 
young men repeatedly produced short intervals in four experimental trials, 
either in a temperate (22°C, relative humidity 35% ) or hot (42 °C, relative 
humidity 18% ) environment, without exercise (passive) or walking on a 
treadmill with moderate intensity at 60% VO2max (active). The CFF was 
measured before and after the exercise test, whereas core temperature (TC), 
heart rate (HR), perceived fatigue (CR-10) and effort (RPE) were registered 
after every 15 minutes during the exercise test. According to the concept of the 
central fatigue (Nybo, 2008; Nybo & Nielsen, 2001a; 2001b), the dependent 
measures in Study I indicate the possible contribution of both peripheral and 
central processes involved in exercise-heat stress. Therefore, within the arousal-
pacemaker paradigm, it is possible to distinguish the contribution of either 
peripheral markers (TC, HR) or psychological and more central factors (CFF, 
subjective feelings) of arousal to timing behaviour. In addition to the RPE, 
which is assumed to reflect both the physiological and psychological effects of 
exercise-heat stress in the current study (Morgan, 1973), CR-10 was included to 
measure the intensity of fatigue. Fatigue is considered to be a complex emotion 
affected by motivation, drive, other emotions (e.g., anger, fear) and previous 
experience (St.Clair-Gibson, Baden, Lambert, Lambert et al., 2003). 
Study I employed a temporal production task, where the subjects were 
required to produce short intervals (0.5, 0.75., 1, 2, 3, 5, 10 seconds) with the 
instruction to use chronometric counting. The instruction to count was applied 
for several reasons. As exercise-heat stress was expected to exhibit considerable 
strain on the subjects, the attempt was to have their focus on the time production 
task and increase their temporal accuracy by the counting strategy (Grondin et 
al., 1999; Wearden, 1991) but at the same time assuming temperature to alter 
the basic count unit and thus the produced durations (Wearden & Penton-Voak, 
1995). A linear function was applied to the produced intervals to reduce the 
numbert of data points and to describe the temporal performance in terms of 
linear function estimates a1 and a0, the slope and the intercept of the function, 




conditions was high (r2>.97) with no significant differences between 
experimental trials and individual testing sessions, implying a linear 
relationship between psychological and the real time. Study I interprets the 
results of the time production task mainly by a1, which is suggested to indicate 
the proportionality of the psychological and the real time. The interpretation of 
a0 is more complicated but the respective estimate might be viewed as a shortest 
time residual, presumably reflecting the motor properties of the time production 
task. For example, if the regression coefficients are a1=1 and a0=0, then the 
produced durations could be interpreted to be close to the target intervals (i.e., 
veridical to real time). Therefore, the compression of produced intervals is 
described by a1<1, indicating a relative underproduction of durations, whereas 
a1>1 would refer to a relative overproduction.  
The main results from Study I demonstrate that produced intervals, mostly 
in the range of seconds, are compressed after an hour of moderate exercise in 
the hot environment. The findings are in concordance with the previous studies, 
where a relative underproduction of intervals has been found (François, 1927; 
Hoagland, 1933). The results are interpreted within the internal clock model 
indicating a temperature-induced increase of arousal, which increases the rate of 
subjective time. As a result, the pacemaker sends out impulses at a higher rate, 
those impulses are accumulated faster and in turn, shorter intervals are produced 
due to terminating the durations earlier. With regards to the state-dependent 
variables (TC, HR, CR-10, RPE), there was a clear distinction between the 
active and passive trials. Passive-temperate trial (NNE) served as an exceptional 
control condition, as no changes in subjective states were observed. The active-
hot trial (HEX) induced a significant exercise-heat stress, which was reflected in 
all dependent measures, including the time production task. In the current 
context TC and HR are observed as physiological arousal indicators whereas 
CR-10 and RPE, suggested to reflect affective response to exercise-heat stress, 
are considered to be the indicators of psychological arousal. The CFF as an 
indicator of cortical arousal (Davranche & Pichon, 2005) exhibited a higher 
threshold after the exercise test in HEX trial and although indicating a rise in 
arousal level, is less informative as it was measured post-exercise. However, 
other state-dependent measures showed a continuous rise throughout the 
exercise test in HEX trial, in parallel to changes in a1, which indicated relative 
underproduction of time already after 10 minutes of exercise. Thus, the 
temporal processing exhibited a faster rate as the state-dependent measures 
indicated a rise in the level of arousal.  
In terms of the SET framework, these findings indicate that the combination 
of exercise and thermal stimuli increases the speed of the pacemaker component 
of the clock stage (Figure 1). The coefficient of variation (CV) was similar for 
all durations with the exception of the shortest (0.5 second) interval, overall 
indicating scalar properties (Gibbon et al., 1984; Wearden, 1991; 2003). After 
an hour of exercise in the heat, the relative compression of produced durations 




to be over after 2.6 seconds. According to the internal clock model, the 
pacemaker was emitting pulses at the higher rate and the relevant pulses 
required for the target interval were accumulated in a shorter time, resulting in 
the shorter produced durations.  
At first sight, the results support the concept of the “chemical clock” 
(Hoagland, 1933) – with the higher metabolic rate, the increased speed of the 
internal clock is observed at the behavioural level. However, the changes in 
temporal production in Study I are not reduced exclusively to the changes in 
temperature. In addition to core temperature, also heart rate, perceived fatigue 
and effort increased and might contribute to changes in timing behaviour. Thus, 
both peripheral and central factors were influenced by exercise-heat stress, a 
concept elaborated by Nybo and Nielsen (2001a; 2001b). When the relationship 
between the dependent measures was further observed, perceived fatigue (CR-
10) was significant in influencing the relationship between core temperature and 
a1. Evidently, this indicates the role of psychological arousal and more central 
factors mediating the temperature effects on temporal processing. Prolonged 
exercise in a hot environment elicits an affective response (in this case, higher 
ratings of perceived fatigue), which explains the changes in temporal 
performance. These findings are in agreement with the psychobiological model 
of cognitive appraisal during exercise in extreme environments (Acevedo & 
Ekkekakis, 2001).  
The interpretation of aforementioned findings benefits most from the 
application of the interoceptive model (Craig, 2002), which on closer inspection 
incorporates both the psychobiological model (Acevedo & Ekkekakis, 2001) 
and further elaboration of peripheral and central factors involved in the 
development of the CNS fatigue in extreme environments (Nybo, 2008). 
According to the interoceptive model, feedback from the thermoregulatory 
centres, thermal sensations from the skin, heart rate, exercising muscles and 
joints is processed in the CNS and as a result, a conscious emotional 
representation (e.g., the feeling of fatigue and effort) is generated. 
Representation of the homeostatic afferent activity through sympathetic and 
parasympathetic pathways of the autonomic nervous system is directed via the 
thalamo-cortical extension to the anterior insular cortex, where all the 
information is integrated into bodily feelings and self-awareness. Thus, the 
afferent sensory representation received is related to the homeostatic condition 
of the body and forms the basis of the conscious subjective image of the 
sentient self (Craig, 2002; 2003). Therefore, in the light of the current findings, 
the subjective feelings and the psychological state (i.e., perceived fatigue) 
involve a bodily (physiological) representation of exercise-heat stress based on 
the thermal sensations and heart rate elicited by exercise-heat stress. 
Interestingly, Critchley and colleagues (2004) propose that the intensity of 
emotional awareness reflects the variation in sensitivity to bodily reactions and 
there are frontal-cortex regions involved in the interoceptive attention and 





demonstrated that subjects with high interoceptive awareness showed enhanced 
ERP response to processing both pleasant and unpleasant stimuli. Therefore, the 
level of perceived fatigue in the current study might reflect interoceptive 
awareness, which in turn is related to time perception. The model of forebrain 
asymmetry of emotion provides additional support for interpreting the 
properties of the perceived fatigue in the current experimental context (Craig, 
2005). According to this model, the right forebrain is associated with negative 
emotion, feelings of arousal and avoidance, whereas the left forebrain involves 
positive affect and approach behaviours. These differences are possibly 
reflected in the anterior insular cortex as well. If the assumption of asymmetry 
in homeostatic emotion is considered (Craig, 2005; 2009b), the current findings 
suggest that high ambient temperature is related to higher sympathetic arousing 
activity and concomitant activity in the right anterior insular cortex related to 
negative feelings. In turn, the faster accumulation of emotional moments is 
related to the higher speed of the internal clock and therefore, relatively shorter 
intervals are produced.  
Although a more detailed arousal-pacemaker link provides a possible 
framework for interpreting the results obtained in Study I, the role of attention 
processes in relation to time-sharing hypothesis remains important. More 
precisely, if we assume, according to the interoceptive model, that the 
psychological and physiological state is constantly being monitored and 
processed in the CNS, then attention would be allocated away from the time 
production task and directed towards non-temporal properties (e.g., feelings of 
fatigue, bodily sensations, maintaining motor control during exercise). In 
relation to this assumption, more attentional resources should be located away 
from time (i.e., the interval production task), which generally results in 
overproduction of intervals as it takes a longer time for the temporal pulses to 
be accumulated to match the objective duration (Brown, 1997). Nonetheless, a 
relative underproduction of intervals was observed after an hour of exercise-
heat stress in the current study, which is at first sight contradictory to the time-
sharing hypothesis of time perception (Buhusi & Meck, 2009).  
Although prolonged exercise in the heat leads to a quicker development of 
critical core temperature, cardiovascular strain, fatigue and exhaustion more 
quickly compared to exercising in thermoneutral environment (Nybo & Nielsen, 
2001a; 2001b), Study I indicates that the subjects had not yet reached the 
critical stage of allocating resources after an hour of exercise in the hot 
environment. Rather, we witnessed an increase in activation that contributed to 
the timing performance. Nevertheless, the issues concerning the role of the 
attention mechanism in the current experimental context within the framework 
of the interoceptive model persist, as the monitoring and appraisal of one’s 






3.3 Study II “Effects of heat acclimation  
on time perception” 
Exercise performance and cognitive functioning are impaired during prolonged 
exercise in hot environments (Cian et al., 2000; 2001; Gonzalez-Alonso et al., 
1999). In addition to the thermoregulatory and cardiovascular decrements 
(Hargreaves, 2008), peripheral hormone response is also altered (Bridge et al., 
2003; Low et al., 2005), which provides information about the involvement of 
possible brain mechanisms in exercise-heat stress. However, chronic exposure 
to exercise-heat stress evokes physiological adaptations, which encompass 
improvement in exercise capacity, thermoregulation and metabolic functioning 
(Sawka, Wenger, & Pandolf, 2011). Concerning the endocrine markers, slower 
increase in blood growth hormone (Nielsen, Hales, Strange, Christensen et al., 
1993; Ööpik, Timpmann, Kreegipuu, Unt et al., 2014) and prolactin 
concentration (Bridge et al., 2003; Burk et al., 2012) is observed in alignment 
with the slower rate of increase in core temperature. Lower levels of cortisol are 
assumed to indicate successful heat acclimation and tolerance (Davies, 
Harrison, Cochrane, Edwards et al., 1981; Follenius et al., 1982). The effects of 
heat acclimation on cognitive functioning have rarely been reported. In the 
military context, Radakovic and colleagues (2007) reported improvements in 
complex tasks after heat acclimation whereas more automatic tasks requiring 
simple motor performance were not affected. Interestingly, one study has 
observed the dynamics of time estimation during the heat acclimation program, 
showing a significant decrease in temporal estimations on the first day of heat 
exposure but estimations became actually longer by the 10th day of heat 
exposure (Curley & Hawkins, 1983). Therefore, the physiological adaptations 
observed as a result of heat acclimation might provide further information about 
the underlying mechanisms of time perception.  
In Study II, the effects of exercise-heat stress on temporal interval 
production were further elaborated to investigate the role of physiological and 
psychological factors. In addition to perceived fatigue and exertion measures 
(CR-10 and RPE, respectively), core temperature (TC) and heart rate (HR), 
hormone markers were also included. 20 subjects, who participated in Study I, 
followed a 10-day heat acclimation (HA) program and performed an exercise 
test to exhaustion after acclimation. Similar interval production data was 
included from the exercise test after HA. The exercise test from Study I (HEX) 
is here referred to as H1 (pre-acclimation) and the post-acclimation exercise test 
as H2, with pre-test, 60-minute and post-test measures being compared between 
different experimental trials H1, H2 and N (representing exercise in the 
thermoneutral conditions, NEX in Study I). In addition to the similarly analysed 
time production task in Study I (a1, slope of a linear function), retrospective 
temporal judgements from the first pre-test session were included in the 




task and were required to estimate the duration of one of the slides (3 seconds) 
presenting the stimuli.  
The main findings from Study II indicate that the performance in the 
interval production task is more accurate during the exercise in the heat 
following HA – a1 did not exhibit a similar decrease after 60 minutes of 
exercise in H2 as was observed in H1. Physiological and psychological 
variables demonstrated the effect of HA exhibiting a slower rate of increase in 
H2. The prospective timing task, considered here as an indicator of cognitive 
functioning, shows a similar dynamic to other state-dependent variables. Thus, 
the exercise capacity together with cognitive performance during exercise-heat 
stress benefits from active heat acclimation. When Study I showed the 
significant role of core temperature and perceived fatigue in time perception, 
hormone response was identified as one of the variables related to temporal 
performance in Study II. More precisely, blood prolactin (PRL) concentration 
predicts a1 in both H1 and H2. The changes in PRL concentration are generally 
related to changes in core temperature (Low et al., 2005; Pitsiladis et al., 2002). 
Moreover, Burk and colleagues (2012) demonstrated that the PRL response 
during exercise-heat stress explains around 28% of the inter-individual variance 
in exercise capacity in heat-acclimated subjects. According to Study II, PRL 
levels predict cognitive functioning and in heat-acclimated subjects, perceived 
fatigue and growth hormone (GH) levels were additionally significant 
predictors of the interval production performance. Hence, less stressful 
experimental conditions in H2 are accompanied by a larger a1, indicative of the 
relative overproduction of intervals compared to H1. Again, the dynamics of 
perceived fatigue provides information about the heat tolerance in the 
psychological domain. Based on the results in Study II, perceived fatigue 
seems to benefit most from the active heat acclimation. The heat-acclimated 
subjects rated only their fatigue level to be similar when exercising in temperate 
conditions while the 60-minute measures of H2 for all other variables were 
significantly higher compared to N.  
Interestingly, the retrospective temporal judgments predicted the 
performance in prospective temporal processing, especially in heat-acclimated 
subjects (β = –.35, p<.01). The interpretation of these results would indicate that 
smaller retrospective judgments were accompanied by a larger a1, reflecting a 
more accurate temporal performance. The relationship between prospective and 
retrospective time judgments is not surprising if a central timing mechanism 
with a biological basis is considered. There is previous evidence indicating that 
a performance in one temporal task is generally related to the performance in 
another type of timing task (Merchant, Harrington, & Meck, 2013). In other 
words, good performers in one behavioural context appear to be good 
performers in another as well, suggesting the existence of a common timing 
mechanism. The current findings also show that the retrospective timing 
performance is a predictor of prospective performance after heat acclimation, 




stimuli in stressful conditions. In the retrospective task, the subjects who were 
more engaged in the non-temporal task and underestimated the duration 
retrospectively, were more accurate in the prospective task after active heat 
acclimation. This implies that those subjects, who were probably more efficient 
in directing their attention towards task-relevant information in the retrospective 
timing (i.e., non-temporal visuospatial requirements) were also able to direct 
attention towards task-relevant information in the prospective timing task (i.e., 
estimate temporal properties) under stressful conditions. Hence, the role of 
individual differences in cognitive functioning and timing behaviour might be 
important in stressful conditions.  
Additional references based on Study II are made regarding the brain 
mechanisms involved in exercise-heat stress and time perception. When 
considering the peripheral markers of heat stress in relation to brain 
mechanisms, PRL secretion is stimulated by serotonin (Weicker & Strüder, 
2001; Van der Kar, Rittenhouse, Li, & Levy, 1996) and inhibited by dopamine 
(Ben-Jonathan & Hnasko, 2001). Blood PRL concentrations are sensitive to 
temperature effects as the rise in hormone response corresponds to the rise in 
core temperature during prolonged exercise (Bridge et al., 2003; Low et al., 
2005), participating in the onset of central fatigue (Roelands & Meeusen, 2010). 
As a result, the involvement of central serotonin activity in the development of 
central fatigue and decline in exercise performance has been implicated 
(Pitsiladis et al., 2002). With regard to the respective brain mechanisms, the 
current findings concerning the PRL response suggest a possible involvement of 
both serotonergic and dopaminergic activity in time perception during exercise-
heat stress. Indeed, changes in cerebral metabolism reported in the CNS fatigue 
research (Nielsen & Nybo, 2003) implicate brain areas involved in both 
thermoregulation, exercise and time perception. For example, a rise in core 
temperature has been shown to increase the cerebral metabolic rate in the 
hypothalamus, thalamus thalamus, the cerebellum, the cingulate gyrus, whereas 
a decrease in the metabolic activity was observed in the basal ganglia and the 
insular cortex among other regions in the brain (Nunneley et al., 2002). The 
cerebellum and the basal ganglia have been previously implicated in temporal 
processing (Coull et al., 2011) and the current experimental manipulations with 
temperature presumably induced changes in the activity of these brain regions. 
In addition, the insular cortex and the cingulate gyrus have been suggested by 
Craig (2009a; 2009b) to be involved in interoceptive awareness and behavioural 
control – processes relevant for timing behaviour. Of course, this conclusion is 
purely inferential as the exact behaviour of these neural systems was not 
directly observed. However, the underlying brain mechanisms related to timing 










The findings from Study I and Study II suggest that the traditional arousal-
pacemaker hypothesis is not sufficient to explain the temperature effects on 
time perception. Although the concept of arousal is supported, the effect cannot 
be reduced to the rise in core temperature. The contribution of psychological 
state-dependent factors, more precisely, perceived fatigue, should be considered 
as a possible mediator of temperature effects. The interoceptive model (Craig, 
2003; 2009a; 2009b) provides a structural framework for interpretation of these 
results.  
The concept of interoception, or sentience, as referred to in affective time 
perception research (Schirmer, 2011), has become widely prominent when 
explaining the interaction between the physiological and psychological 
processes and their contribution to timing behaviour. Interoceptive processing 
involves integrating series of feelings across time, which is related to the central 
temporal processing in general (Craig, 2004; 2009b). Sensory displeasure is 
responsible for the negative affective response during exhaustive exercise and 
extreme environmental stress (Gaoua et al., 2012), accompanied by increased 
sympathetic activity (Craig, 2009a). The findings from Study I suggested that 
higher perceived fatigue and also perceived effort might reflect higher sentient 
processing of bodily state and thus, mediate temporal judgments under exercise-
heat stress. Study II provided further evidence about the physiological changes 
in relation to active heat acclimation and the role of hormone response in 
predicting cognitive functioning measured with interval production. The brain 
mechanisms, which are important for both time perception and interoceptive 
awareness, provide a possible explanation for the temperature induced changes 
in interval production. Increase in both physiological and psychological arousal 
is accompanied by a higher pacemaker rate and hence, faster internal clock. 
However, it is important to consider the internal clock model within the 
interoceptive framework and the role of subjective fatigue, attentional processes 





4 EMOTIONAL FACTORS MODULATING  
TIME PERCEPTION 
Emotions change time perception by speeding up or slowing down the internal 
clock. Time perception has been shown to be dependent on emotional content 
irrespective of its modality and overestimation of emotional stimuli compared 
to neutral ones is generally observed. For example, Lambrechts and colleagues 
(2011) showed a greater precision for reproducing non-emotional stimuli 
compared to emotional stimuli (pleasant or unpleasant). The duration of 
emotional faces was perceived to be longer than of neutral expressions (Droit-
Volet, Brunot, & Niedenthal, 2004), especially angry faces (Gil & Droit-Volet, 
2011; Tipples, 2008). Similar results were obtained with emotional sounds, 
which were perceived to last longer and the effect was greater for negative 
stimuli (Noulhiane, Mella, Samson, Ragot et al., 2007), which relies upon the 
assumption that the latter generates a stronger response (i.e., more arousing) 
than positive stimuli (Cacciopo & Gardner, 1999). Thus, the research suggests 
that emotionally charged events are perceived to last longer relative to neutral 
ones, indicating subjective lengthening of time. Emotional experience is 
accompanied by physiological changes, which are assumed to be responsible for 
the variations in subjective time by affecting the pacemaker rate in emitting 
pulses into the accumulator (Burle & Casini, 2001). Therefore, emotion effects 
on timing behaviour are often explained by the arousal-pacemaker link (Droit-
Volet and Meck, 2007; Droit-Volet and Gil, 2009).  
However, emotional time perception research suffers from the poorly 
defined concept of arousal, which is considered equal to sympathetic activation. 
In addition, the concept of emotional arousal and how it is associated with the 
internal clock is an open question, because the weak relationship between the 
actual arousal measures and the timing performance suggests alternative 
interpretations (Schirmer, 2011). These concerns are further supported by the 
evidence from Study I and Study II, where physiological state-variables were 
insufficient to explain timing behaviour, and instead, the role of psychological 
state and possible contribution of attentional processes were suggested. In 
Study III, the arousal and attentional processes involved in the timing of 
emotional stimuli are approached within the affective attention paradigm. 
 
 
4.1 The integration of attention and arousal  
in the affective modulation of time 
Interpretation of emotion effects on time perception through the arousal 
mechanism becomes even more difficult when considering the time course of 
physiological changes and timing behaviour. Subjective lengthening of time in 
relation to emotional stimuli is generally evident in brief durations (i.e., less 




(Droit-Volet et al., 2004; Mella et al., 2011; Noulhiane et al., 2007). Rather 
paradoxically, physiological changes indicating the level of arousal are 
relatively slow, with skin conductance and heart rate taking several seconds to 
peak (Kreibig, 2010). Moreover, it is suggested that different emotions elicit 
distinct activation patterns in the autonomic nervous system (Ekman, Levenson, 
& Friesen, 1983; for a review, see Levenson, 2014). In time perception 
research, there is evidence of emotions affecting temporal judgments without 
the increase in concomitant physiological markers, as shown by overestimation 
of sad faces (Lee, Seelam, & O’Brien, 2011) and in the case of boredom 
(Danckert & Allman, 2005).  
Taking into consideration the sporadic plausibility of the arousal-pacemaker 
link in explaining how emotions influence time perception, the contribution of 
attention processes should be investigated. According to this, temporal 
estimations are dependent on the cognitive resources allocated to the processing 
of stimuli, more precisely, how much attention is devoted to time. In terms of 
the SET model, the attention mechanism involves the functioning of the switch 
at the clock stage (Zakay & Block, 1997), which operates differently for 
emotional than for neutral stimuli, depending on the allocation of attention. If 
attention is directed towards temporal properties, fewer pulses are lost and time 
estimation tends to be rather accurate. However, processing of emotional 
stimuli is assumed to deflect attention away from the temporal properties of the 
stimulus towards the emotional properties and relative underestimation of 
emotional stimuli occurs (Gil, Rousset, & Droit-Volet, 2009; Lui et al., 2011). 
Of course, if the attention mechanism is indeed involved, the emotional stimuli 
should always distract attention away from the temporal properties, resulting in 
relative underestimations compared to the processing of neutral stimuli. 
However, overestimation of emotional stimuli is often observed, which is 
inconsistent with the classical interpretation of the attention mechanism 
(Schirmer, 2011). Nevertheless, a clarification in terms of the attention 
mechanism is required in relation to estimating temporal properties of 
emotional stimuli and specifically, the way in which temporal and non-temporal 
properties require attentional processing. Moreover, the interpretation of 
emotion effects on timing might benefit from integrating the concepts of arousal 
and attention in the SET framework. In addition, emotional modulation of time 
could benefit from the concept of interoceptive awareness (Craig, 2009b, 
Schirmer, 2011) with elaborating the influence of emotion-induced 
physiological changes on sentient processing. Indeed, the embodiment of 
emotion seems to be crucial when emotional stimuli are timed (Effron, 
Niedenthal, Gil, & Droit-Volet, 2006). Therefore, when considering the 
mechanisms of affective time perception within the internal clock model, it 
seems difficult to differentiate activation and attention processes and the 
direction of temporal distortions. Rather, it should be interesting to explore the 




4.2 Study III “Emotional modulation of attention 
affects time perception: Evidence from  
event-related potentials” 
Emotions elicit alterations in the internal clock mechanism in two ways. Firstly, 
emotional stimuli increase bodily arousal and as a result, the pacemaker emits 
more pulses within the same unit of real time to be gathered in the accumulator. 
Hence, overestimation (or underproduction) of durations is observed, 
corresponding to subjective lengthening of time. Secondly, the attention 
mechanism might affect the functioning of the switch, as described before. If 
attention is directed away from time towards the emotional dimension of a 
stimulus, the durations are judged shorter due to the accumulation of fewer 
pulses, implicating a fluctuation of the switch between opened and closed states 
(Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007).  
Study III applied the affective attention paradigm to investigate emotional 
influences on time perception. More precisely, event-related potential (ERP) 
correlates of different stages of affective attention were employed to 
differentiate arousal and attention processes in timing the emotional stimuli. To 
further explore the time-course of the attention process and emotional guidance 
of selective attention and their role in time perception, event related potentials 
(ERPs) grant a possibility of observing both early and late modulations of 
neural responses with high temporal sensitivity. These modulations are 
considered to reflect distinct stages of stimulus processing (Schupp, Flaisch, 
Stockburger, & Junghöfer, 2006). Although early ERPs P1 and N1 reflect 
processing of stimulus-specific properties at the pre-attentive level (Hillyard, 
Vogel, & Luck, 1998), they are also influenced by emotion (Pourtois, Dan, 
Grandjean, Sander et al., 2005). However, ERP components EPN (Early 
Posterior Negativity, 150–300 ms from stimulus onset) and LPP (Late Positive 
Potential, from 300 ms and onwards from stimulus onset) have been shown to 
exhibit longer and more sustained processing of emotional stimuli (Schupp et 
al., 2006). These two ERP components suggest a two-stage account of affective 
attention (Schupp et al., 2006; Uusberg, Uibo, Kreegipuu, Tamm et al., 2013), 
reflecting more automatic processing of the stimuli in early stages (EPN) 
compared to later stages, where top-down effects are more evident (LPP). EPN 
presumably involves the attentional selection of the motivationally significant 
stimuli for further processing and is considered as a measure of automatic 
attentional capture. On the contrary, LPP should reflect attentional control and 
affective experience, which is related to the meaning rather than the physical 
properties of the stimuli. In addition, LPP is particularly informative about the 
overall emotional arousal induced by emotional stimuli (Schupp et al., 2006). 
These two ERP components elicit different patterns for emotional compared to 
neutral stimuli, indicating two distinct stages of affective attention and possibly 
reflecting the differences in the engagement of top-down control over stimulus-





attentional systems together with specific ERP components provides an 
opportunity to differentiate the contribution of attention and arousal 
mechanisms in time perception, with EPN reflecting attentional involvement 
and LPP affective arousal. 
Study III applied the previously described ERP correlates of affective 
attention in distinguishing different sources behind temporal distortions. 62 
students (42 females) produced brief temporal intervals (0.9, 1.5, 2.7 and 3.3 
seconds) while observing images with highly arousing content (erotic and 
aversive) in addition to neutral images from the International Affective Picture 
System (Lang et al, 2008). P1, EPN and LPP components were analysed in 
relation to affective attention stages (Schupp et al., 2006). Additionally, the 
Contingent Negative Variation (CNV) was analysed as the respective ERP 
component, which has been suggested to reflect the accumulation of pulses 
encompassing the perceived duration (Macar & Vidal, 2004; Mella & Pouthas, 
2011), although some recent work casts doubt on this (van Rijn, Kononowicz, 
Meck, Ng et al., 2011).  
The main findings from Study III indicate that emotional effects on time 
perception varied with the duration to be timed. At the behavioural level, 
affective alterations were present for 0.9, 1.5 and 2.7 s intervals. The differences 
between unpleasant and pleasant stimuli were observed for 0.9 and 1.5 s 
intervals. The durations produced during unpleasant images where relatively 
shorter compared to neutral and pleasant trials for the 0.9 s interval. However, 
pleasant stimuli significantly lengthened produced durations for 1.5 s and 
shortened them for 2.7 s intervals. For the 3.3 s interval, all stimuli were 
relatively underproduced. Thus, the complex pattern observed for the 
behavioural results cannot be explained by any single underlying mechanism. In 
addition, Coefficient of Variation (CV) was affected by both, affective category 
and duration, indicating a larger CV for unpleasant stimuli and a progressive 
decrease of CV with the larger durations. Specifically, the 0.9 s interval 
exhibited differences between the affective categories in the respective manner. 
Concurrently, the ERPs demonstrated enhanced amplitudes equally in P1 and 
LPP components for both unpleasant and pleasant stimuli. With regard to EPN, 
the respective ERP component showed enhanced response to pleasant than to 
unpleasant stimuli (see Figure 3 in Study III). For CNV analysis, all trials were 
distributed to short, accurate and long responses for the two longer durations 
(2.7 and 3.3 s). However, CNV showed no differences regarding production 
performance as well as affective modulation, which is in line with the proposal 
by van Rijn et al., (2011) that CNV might reflect peripheral aspects of time 
perception (e.g., the processes related to motor preparation and decision 
making).  
These findings lead to several conclusions. First, although a complex pattern 
of behavioural response was observed, the overall tendency for the affective 
stimuli was to increase the rate of subjective time rather than decrease it. These 




internal clock in emotional states (Angrilli et al, 1997; Droit-Volet et al., 2004; 
Gil & Droit-Volet, 2011; Noulhiane et al., 2007). Second, a duration-dependent 
valence-specificity occurred, whereby the shortest durations were affected by 
unpleasant stimuli and the longer intervals by pleasant stimuli. Third, the results 
also replicated the common finding that emotions tend to elicit changes in time 
perception for relatively brief durations (Mella et al., 2011; Noulhiane et al., 
2007), in Study III up to 2.7 s.  
The behavioural results observed in Study III are difficult to explain 
through the arousal-pacemaker link, proposed by the SET model. More 
precisely, the effects of emotional arousal speeding up or slowing down the 
internal clock cannot exclusively account for the affective distortions in timing 
performance. Therefore, a possible role of the attention mechanism should be 
considered. Furthermore, CV did not remain constant across durations, contrary 
to the assumption of scalar properties (Wearden, 1999; 2003). Significant 
differences in variation between pleasant and unpleasant stimuli for 0.9 s and a 
substantial underproduction of unpleasant stimuli indicate valence effects on the 
internal clock. However, this valence-specificity was observed to be duration 
dependent, as a relative underproduction of unpleasant intervals for shorter 
durations (0.9 and 1.5 s) was reversed at the 2.7 s duration, where the pleasant 
stimuli were relatively more underproduced. The observed decrease in CV 
values with the increase of duration to be timed might suggest that the subjects 
were engaged in chronometric counting, generally shown to yield a decrease in 
temporal variation (Wearden, 1999). Although, in the current study, counting 
strategy was not directly instructed in addition to the use of integers as target 
durations, it was neither prohibited. Thus, the involvement of chronometric 
counting, responsible for the observed CV values, cannot be ruled out. 
However, respective changes in behavioural results might provide additional 
information about the underlying mechanism, presumably implicating the role 
of attention. A rather similar finding was obtained by Noulhiane et al. (2007), 
who interpreted it with possible interference between the attention and arousal 
mechanisms, which reduced the difference between affective and neutral 
stimuli, especially for longer durations and highly arousing stimuli. The absence 
of an emotional effect on longer durations might indicate increased activation 
by the emotional stimuli accompanied by a progressive increase of attention 
allocation between emotional and temporal properties. Attentional sharing 
would elicit a loss of pulses and thereby differences are not present for the 
affective and neutral stimuli, especially for longer durations. Nevertheless, the 
detection of the exact source of variance in behavioural response is problematic, 
as the various clock components and their respective contributions are difficult 
to disentangle.  
The present findings in ERPs provide additional information about the 
possible role of the attention mechanisms. In respect to behavioural data, both 
unpleasant and pleasant stimuli evoked significant modulations relative to 




images evoked stronger affective modulation in EPN compared to unpleasant 
images, which suggests that the former were more captivating of early attention 
resources. Differences were absent in P1 and LPP, indicating a somewhat 
similar arousal level for various stimuli. Thus, the results suggest that the 
valence-sensitivity of timing behaviour might be related to the valence 
differences reflected in automatic selective attention. According to this, high-
arousal pleasant stimuli were more efficient in capturing attention.  
However, taking into account the duration-dependent behaviour, the 
interplay between arousal and attention mechanisms should be considered. The 
involvement of the arousal mechanism in timing is more prevalent at shorter 
durations whereas the attention processes become relevant at longer durations. 
Indeed, previous evidence shows the overestimation of negative stimuli for 
durations less than 1 s (Gil & Droit-Volet, 2012; Tipples, 2008), which is 
characteristic of the negativity bias reflecting fear-induced arousal effects 
(Caccioppo & Gardner, 1999). Therefore in Study III, the relative under-
production of 0.9 s unpleasant images with more variability implicates the 
arousal mechanism, which is in line with the assumption that the processing of 
negative stimuli, reflecting withdrawal and avoidance behaviour (Gable & 
Poole, 2012; Pourtois et al., 2013) evokes greater activation. Hence, the shorter 
intervals involve perceptual responses to emotional stimuli, especially rapid 
detection of threat, whereas longer durations reflect a more elaborate cognitive 
processing of emotional information, presumably related to subjective 
experience and the appraisal of emotions.  
Emotional and physiological states both contribute to the timing behaviour 
and thus, the awareness of emotions might be crucial to subjective passage of 
time. For example, self-regulation of emotions has been found to affect time 
perception, based on the assumption that regulatory behaviour directs attention 
to time (Vohs & Schmeichel, 2003). Of course, in the current experimental 
context, self-regulation was not monitored. Moreover, emotional attention 
might be dependent on current emotional context but also on the emotional state 
of the subject (Cornwell et al., 2011), implicating both stimulus-driven and top-
down attention processes. Thus, at longer durations, where attention processes 
are predominant, they might be directed towards time, physical features or goal-
relevant properties of emotional stimuli but also to emotional awareness and 
appraisal. Although EPN indeed suggests that early attention mechanisms might 
be involved in timing the pleasant stimuli, the way attention affects the internal 
clock is still an open question.  
In the former context, the model of interoceptive awareness might again 
prove to be useful for explaining the emotional distortion of time (Craig, 2009b; 
Wittmann, 2009) by integrating the concepts of arousal and attention by adding 
the aspect of sentient processing. All these mechanisms might have different 
weights in contributing to the experience of time under emotional modulation, 
depending on the stimulus properties, current situation and even individual 




focus to gain prioritized processing in the perceptual system (Pourtois et al., 
2013), thereby increasing physiological arousal and increasing sentient 
processing. As a result, the internal clock runs faster and temporal intervals are 
overestimated (or underproduced). Furthermore, stimulus-specific sentient 
processing would explain the differences in temporal processing of emotional 
stimuli, thus the variation in subjective time depends on the specific experience 
of oneself in relation to stimulus properties and different events (Schirmer, 
2011). This would also explain temporal variations for emotional stimuli with a 
similar arousal level. For example, Gil and Droit-Volet (2012) recently showed 
that disgust-eliciting images were overestimated compared to fear-inducing 
images. Although they concluded that arousal is the main mediator behind these 
effects, the influence of pictorial content has a significant role. Pollatos and 
colleagues (2014) demonstrated that interoceptive focus changes subjective 
time depending on the emotional valence, supposedly reflecting differences in 
autonomic reactivity. Thus, the arousal and attention mechanisms are 
presumably inherently linked regarding time perception.  
Associating emotional awareness and stimulus-specific sentient processing 
with time perception would not require explaining attentional effects in regards 
to allocating resources between temporal and non-temporal information. 
Instead, the sentient processing theory assumes that a close link between 
emotional and temporal processing results in increased or decreased allocation 
of attention to both emotions and time (Craig, 2009b; Schirmer, 2011). Indeed, 
prioritised processing of emotional stimuli might actually convey evolutionary 
benefits. For example, it is reasonable to assume that detecting a threat should 
involve temporal information in addition to processing stimulus-specific 
features and thereby, sustained attention to stimulus processing might enhance 
temporal processing as well. Taken together, emotional stimuli might indeed 
capture more attention, which also facilitates the perception of temporal 




Arousal as well as attention processes are implicated by the emotional 
modulation of time perception. Duration-dependent valence-specificity of 
behavioural response suggests that the arousal-pacemaker link alone is 
insufficient to explain emotional distortions of subjective time. The absence of 
clear distinction in the produced durations between affective and neutral stimuli 
restricts interpretation of behavioural results in terms of arousal mechanisms. 
Instead, ERPs suggest the involvement of attention processes in timing the 
affective stimuli. More specifically, the valence differences in EPN refer to 
more pronounced attentional capture of pleasant stimuli and the affective 
modulation of time perception. However, the traditional interpretation of 





applicable as the attentional capture of non-temporal information would yield to 
relative overproduction of the emotional stimuli. Rather, the results suggest the 
possible facilitation of temporal processing with the increased attention to 
affective stimuli. Valence effects observed are duration-dependent, suggesting 
that the estimation of shorter intervals involves perceptual responses to 
emotional stimuli and physiological activation, whereas longer durations 
involve top-down modulation of emotional information. These findings suggest 
that a complex interplay between arousal and attention mechanisms are 
involved in affective modulation of time perception. In addition, the sentient 
processing might reflect the specific valence-dependent effects on subjective 
time, incorporated in the integrated model by Schirmer (2011). Emotional 
modulation of subjective time evokes bodily changes, which modify the 
experience of self across time and affect the way stimulus duration is perceived. 
Different affective states might involve specific activation patterns, which 
explain the differences in temporal processing of various emotional stimuli. 
Therefore, the intrinsic relationship between the attention and arousal 
mechanisms with the contingent role of sentient processing should be 
considered.  
More importantly, Study III demonstrated the benefits of applying a two-
stage paradigm of affective attention in time perception, especially the use of 
ERP correlates differentiating the early attentional capture and subsequent 
arousal processes induced by emotional stimuli. The processing stages of 
affective stimuli could be further applied to disentangle the arousal and 





5 THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES  
IN TIME PERCEPTION 
Temperature manipulations and emotional stimuli affect temporal processing, 
which is often explained by the alterations in the physiological state. As a result, 
the level of arousal changes, inducing alterations in the internal clock and time 
perception. However, the possible involvement of psychological state in 
explaining the effects of temperature (Study I and Study II) and the valence of 
emotional stimuli resulting in temporal processing differences (Study III) 
suggest the possible role of attention in the variability of timing behaviour. 
Thus, in addition to bottom-up processes involved with sensory information, 
top-down processes related to attention and behaviour regulation should be 
considered. The role of individual differences in both trait and state becomes 
evident with the assumption that time perception is a cognitively mediated 
process, which requires integration of information at different information 
processing levels (Hancock, Szalma, & Oron-Gilad, 2005). For example, the 
valence of emotion would provide information about the stimulus beyond the 
sensory processing level (e.g., flight-response), affecting memory processes at 
the higher levels of cognitive processing (Bower, 1981; Martin & Clore, 2001). 
Assuming that time perception depends on how an individual is directing 
attention towards temporal or non-temporal information (i.e., in prospective 
tasks) or how a duration already passed is remembered (i.e., in retrospective 
tasks), cognitive abilities including working memory capacity, are important for 
time estimation (Fink & Neubauer, 2005). Processing of temporal information 
has also been associated to music-related abilities, as musicians are more 
accurate with auditory fusion, rhythm perception and temporal discrimination 
(Rammsayer & Altenmüller, 2006), they tend to have better rhythmical 
precision and therefore, better timing control (Wagner, 1971), and they are 
better in detecting small temporal changes in auditory sequences (Jones & Yee, 
1997), reflecting mainly the automatic and perceptual processing of time. 
Regarding personality, inconsistent results have been found with introverted 
neurotics overproducing intervals compared to extraverted neurotics (Eysenck, 
1959), whereas a linear relationship was not observed between neuroticism and 
time estimation (Rammsayer, 1997). Interestingly, participants with higher 
psychoticism have been found to be more accurate with lower tendency to 
overestimate time in the range of seconds, presumably indicating better 
allocation of attention to temporal information (Rammsayer, 2002). Although 
gender-related differences are often found with female participants over-
estimating time (Glicksohn & Hadad, 2012), personality traits should be 
considered (Rammsayer, 2002). Age-related differences in time perception are 
often reported as small children exhibit a primitive sense of time with scalar 
properties (Droit-Volet, 2011), which develops throughout childhood and 
displays distinct patterns for implicit and explicit time judgments. This 




systems, which are related to attention and working-memory processes (Droit-
Volet, 2013a).  
Alterations in time perception are present in individuals suffering from 
affective disorders. Spider-fearful individuals tend to overestimate images with 
spiders (Buetti & Lleras, 2012; Watts & Sharrock, 1984). Individual differences 
in fearfulness (Tipples, 2011) and trait anxiety (Bar-Haim, Kerem, Lamy, & 
Zakay, 2009) predict overestimation. In a less clinical setting, boredom-prone 
individuals perceive time passing more slowly, presumably due to depressed 
affect (Watt, 1991). Moreover, boredom-prone individuals tend to be more 
impulsive (Watt & Vodanovich, 1992). Suffering from depression alters 
subjective time (Droit-Volet, 2013b; Gil & Droit-Volet, 2009) with depressed 
individuals feeling time passing more slowly. Interestingly, time perception is 
altered in the suprasecond range rather than in the processing of brief intervals 
(Sévigny, Everett, & Grondin, 2013), implicating different brain mechanisms 
(Lewis & Miall, 2006). In the case of mood disorders, processing longer 
durations requires sustained attention, which is probably impaired in depressive 
individuals and therefore, negative thoughts might disrupt temporal processing 
(Droit-Volet, 2013b). Of course, these behaviourally manifested impairments in 
various neurological and psychiatric populations are often presented with 
concurrent disruptions in the brain mechanisms related to time perception 
(Meck, 2005).  
Therefore, individual differences in time perception suggest that there might 
be certain differences in the functioning of an internal clock (Glicksohn & 
Hadad, 2012), assuming a common clock mechanism in a variety of contexts 
does exist (Merchant et al., 2013). However, time perception and temporal 
processing of information are among the fundamental properties of human 
behaviour. If taking into consideration how different cognitive processes are 
involved in estimating shorter and longer durations, perceiving temporal 
properties in stressful conditions or in relation to emotional stimuli, complex 
behaviour could be reduced to the underlying mechanisms. More precisely, time 
perception might reveal attention or activation mechanisms inherent to the 
temporal aspects of cognitive or emotional information processing and decision 
making in general.  
 
 
5.1 Relationship between impulsivity and  
time perception 
Impulsivity is a multidimensional concept and is generally assessed as a trait 
measure (Barratt, 1993) or a personality dimension (Whiteside & Lynam, 
2001). According to Evenden (1999), impulsivity is a disposition to react to 
both internal and external stimuli with insufficient forethought and insensitivity 
towards consequences, resulting in a disinhibited behaviour. Impulsivity has 




2009), risky driving (Paaver, Eensoo, Pulver, & Harro, 2006; Pearson, Murphy, 
& Doane, 2013), pathological gambling (Kräplin, Bühringer, Oosterlaan, van 
den Brink, et al., 2014) and psychopathological disorders (ADHD; Sonuga-
Barke, 2002). In self-reported measures, impulsivity is considered to reflect 
limited deliberation (Dickman, 1990), whereas behavioural measures of 
impulsivity often focus on impaired response inhibition (Logan, Schachar & 
Tannock, 1997). Self-reported and behavioural task measures of impulsive 
behaviour are often found to be unrelated, presumably measuring different 
forms of impulsivity. Assessment of the component structure of self-reported 
measures of impulsivity revealed three factors: Non-planning Dysfunctional, 
Functional Venturesomeness and Drive/Rewards Responsiveness (Miller, 
Jospeh, & Tudway, 2004). Regarding behavioural tasks, a similar analysis by 
Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards and de Wit (2006) resulted in two distinct 
components of behavioural impulsivity: Impulsive Disinhibition (Stop Signal 
and Go/No-Go tasks) and Impulsive Decision Making (Delay Discounting).  
In behavioural impulsivity tasks, impulsive decision making assessed by 
delay discounting paradigm involves deliberately making choices about 
rewards, which requires conscious evaluation of potential outcome of delayed 
versus immediate gains and losses (Reynolds et al., 2006). Hence, this refers to 
more comprehensive cognitive processing, self-control and attention (Wittmann 
& Paulus, 2008). On the other hand, the stop signal paradigm tends to measure 
response inhibition, which is related to more automatic processes and motor 
control. Behavioural excitatory and inhibitory processes are explained in terms 
of a Horse-Race Model (Logan & Cowan, 1984), where two processes, 
initiating and stopping a response, compete with each other. The inability to 
stop a response (i.e., failure to override a reaction already initiated) should be 
characteristic of impulsive behaviour. Inhibitory control is closely linked to 
executive functions and coordinated functioning of selective attention and 
working-memory processes are assumed to be relevant for performance 
monitoring (Reynolds et al., 2006). According to Bari and Robbins (2013), 
attention to abrupt changes in the environment is required to identify the 
stimuli, which signal the inhibition of already planned action or thought. This is 
followed by a shift to a novel behavioural or a cognitive set of response. In 
addition, studies concerning selective attention have shown that irrelevant 
information is not ignored but actually actively suppressed (Posner & Cohen, 
1984). The inhibitory loci in the brain should involve prefrontal regions as well 
as subcortical areas. The areas specifically related to response suppression are 
the basal ganglia, the cerebellum and the hippocampus among several other 
regions (for a review, see Bari & Robbins, 2013). In addition, the noradrenergic 
system in the prefrontal cortex is important for response inhibition and 
suppression of prepotent reaction, whereas dopaminergic activity in the striatum 
is involved in both response activation and inhibition in regards of motor 





It has been proposed that impulsivity and time perception are closely linked 
constructs (Berlin & Rolls, 2004; Berlin, Rolls, & Kischka, 2004) and time 
estimation is even considered to be a behavioural task directly measuring 
impulsivity (Glicksohn, Leshem, & Aharoni, 2006). Although time perception 
predicts impulsivity in general (Baumann & Odum, 2012), the relationship 
between impulsive behaviour and time perception has been studied most often 
with a delay-discounting paradigm, focusing on the temporal properties of a 
decision making process (Wittmann & Paulus, 2008). According to this, 
temporally delayed rewards have less value for impulsive individuals and this is 
directly related to their sense of time. More specifically, they choose immediate 
smaller rewards over delayed bigger rewards because they have a tendency to 
overestimate the duration between “now” and the moment, when a reward is 
obtained. Due to alterations in perceived time, the value of a future reward is 
perceived to be lower (Rubia, Halari, Christakou, & Taylor, 2009). Thus, the 
subjective value of a reward is a function of time and it tends to vary for 
different individuals (Wittmann & Paulus, 2008). Stimulant-dependent 
individuals demonstrate impaired time perception and non-planning 
impulsiveness on the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11, Barratt, Stanford, 
Dowdy, Liebmann et al., 1999) tends to be a mediating factor in longer intervals 
(53 s) but not for 1 s and 2 s intervals (Wittmann, Leleand, Churan, & Paulus, 
2007). These results are in accordance with distinct timing systems 
differentiating between automatic timing of shorter durations and cognitively 
mediated timing of longer intervals (Lewis & Miall, 2003a). Recently, 
Wittmann and colleagues (2014) showed that individuals with a higher 
dispositional mindfulness were more accurate in the duration estimation and 
also reported themselves being less impulsive. These results were interpreted in 
regards to stronger awareness of sensory experience and better temporal self-
control in more mindful individuals, which includes a better awareness of brief 
temporal durations as well (Wittmann & Schmidt, 2014). Neuroimaging studies 
show altered brain mechanisms in individuals with high impulsivity, 
dysfunctional behaviour and impaired time perception (Christakou, Brammer, 
& Rubia, 2011; Rubia et al., 2009). Children with ADHD had abnormalities in 
prefrontal, cingulate, striatal and cerebellar regions, which are all implicated in 
time perception (Rubia et al., 2009). Moreover, in regards to the dopamine 
(DA) hypothesis (Allman & Meck, 2012; Meck, 1996), behavioural 
dysfunctions in ADHD were normalized as a result of administering DA 
agonists and thus, linking impulsivity, time perception and ADHD with 
dopaminergic dysregulation in the brain (Rubia et al., 2009). Patients with 
lesions in the orbitofrontal cortex overestimated time intervals while performing 
more impulsively on both self-reported and behavioural measures of impulsivity 
(Berlin et al., 2004). This was suggested to reflect faster cognitive tempo 
together with higher level of subjective anger and the frustration towards 




are unresolved and the role of affective and cognitive processes, self-control and 
time perception are yet to be determined. 
According to the SET model, the underlying mechanism behind the observed 
effects might be different. For example, impulsive tendencies may affect timing 
behaviour in a way that the accumulator processes are terminated much earlier 
or the pacemaker mechanism may be functioning differently in relation to the 
personality dispositions (Hancock & Weaver, 2005). On the other hand, the 
attention mechanism could be operating differently on the switch component. 
For example, in regards to affective disorders, depressive individuals are more 
easily distracted from temporal properties (Droit-Volet, 2013b). Exploring the 
relationship between time perception and various impulsivity measures is a 
rather challenging aim of Study IV, as the impulsive tendencies detected by 
either self-reports or behavioural tasks are assumed to be different. In addition 
to the multidimensional nature of impulsivity (Evenden, 1999), impulsive 
tendencies might be sensitive to various states and stimuli, thereby exhibiting 
variability depending on the context. The properties of time perception and 
impulsive behaviour most probably involve the interplay of several cognitive 
processes and discovering distinct contributions of the underlying mechanisms 
is therefore difficult.  
 
 
5.2 Study IV “Links between self-reported and 
laboratory behavioural impulsivity” 
Impulsive behaviour and time perception presumably exhibit a great degree of 
overlap in functional properties. Although time perception is suggested to 
involve a central clock mechanism, the distinct processes underlying different 
time scales have been identified – more automatic perceptual processes related 
to the motor response and cognitively mediated processes, which require 
cognitive control and attention (Lewis & Miall, 2003a). A similar 
differentiation has been suggested for behavioural impulsivity tasks, with 
response inhibition reflecting a more automatic motor reaction and, impulsive 
decision making, which requires a more elaborate cognitive processing in order 
to make a conscious choice (Reynolds et al., 2006). Of course, despite the 
differentiation between these underlying processes, aspects of mood, affective 
processing, attention and activation have been associated with impulsive 
behaviour in general (Wittmann & Paulus, 2008). The relative contribution of 
these processes underlying different aspects of impulsive and timing behaviour 
is yet to be resolved.  
The aim of Study IV was to provide a better understanding between time 
perception and different aspects of impulsivity. 58 healthy subjects (28 females, 
average age 21.9 ± 2.7 years) performed the Stop Signal Task (SST) together 
with self-reported impulsivity on Adaptive and Maladaptive Impulsivity Scale 




Functional and Dysfunctional Impulsivity scales (Dickman, 1990) as well as 
two impulsivity-related scales Impulsivity and Excitement Seeking from the 
Estonian version of the International Personality Item Pool (Mõttus, Pullmann, 
& Allik, 2006). SST was used as a measure of behavioural impulsivity to assess 
excitation and inhibition response, with 25% of Stop-trials among Go-trials and 
applying the adaptive delay of a stop signal depending on the subject’s 
response. For successful performance in the SST, constant monitoring of 
performance and adjustment of reaction is required, which means finding an 
optimal balance between a quick excitatory and inhibitory response production. 
This is based on the assumption that subjects tend to adjust response strategies 
proactively when they expect the Stop-trial to appear or, reactively after the 
Stop-trials (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). For the assessment of response 
inhibition, stop signal reaction time (SSRT) was found by subtracting the stop 
signal delay (SSD) from median reaction time on Go-trials (GoRT). Those task 
parameters are generally used in studies applying the SST paradigm (Aron & 
Poldrack, 2006). In addition, the after-effects of preceding trials were analysed, 
as it might result in switch costs or repetition benefits in the following trials 
(Monsell, 2003). For example, children suffering from ADHD have been shown 
to slow their reaction less compared to healthy subjects after failing to stop a 
response (Schachar, Chen, Logan, Ornstein et al., 2004). Finally, time 
estimation was measured by retrospective time estimation task, similar to Study 
II. The subjects were performing a visual short-term memory task on a slide 
presentation program, and after the third slide the subjects were asked to 
estimate the duration of the slide presenting visual stimuli (actual presentation 
time 3 s).  
The main findings from Study IV corroborate some of the previous findings, 
where a weak or absent relationship between the self-reported and behavioural 
impulsivity measures was observed (Lane et al., 2003; Reynolds et al., 2006). 
However, retrospective time judgment was correlated with both types of 
impulsivity measures. A positive relationship was found for Thoughtlessness 
subscale in AMIS (AMIS-D) and negative relationship was observed for several 
SST parameters (see Table 2, Study IV). The longer estimated 3 s duration was 
related to faster reaction in Go-trials and higher probability of erroneous 
performance on Stop-trials. Furthermore, overestimation of duration was 
accompanied by a shorter delay of the stop signal (SSD) by the end of the SST. 
Taken together, overestimation of time was related to both stopping and 
initiating a response in SST, and to reporting higher rate of dysfunctional 
decision making. Interestingly, men significantly underestimated time compared 
to women (2.9 and 3.3 s, respectively). When gender was included as a 
categorical predictor in the regression model, AMIS-D (i.e., Thoughtlessness) 
and reaction time on Go-trials explained 32% of the variance in the time 
estimation task.  
These results suggest that the temporal properties underlying impulsive 




indeed perceive time to pass differently from less impulsive individuals, which 
is assumed to reflect differences in the rate of cognitive tempo (Wittmann & 
Paulus, 2008). However, the underlying mechanism of the cognitive tempo 
remains unclear. The role of mood and affective state could be additional 
factors mediating the impulsive behaviour and timing performance. Considering 
that temporal awareness is related to emotional experience (Craig, 2009a; 
2009b), impulsive individuals might present stronger sentient processing and 
interoceptive awareness. For example, they might get more frustrated (Berlin et 
al., 2004) when failing to inhibit their response or being unable to adjust their 
behaviour according to task requirements. Higher erroneous performance in 
Stop-trials provides support for this assumption. Sentient processing in 
impulsive individuals could reflect heightened emotional arousal and lowered 
ability to exercise self-control, including inhibitory control (Wittmann et al., 
2014). Thus, the impulsive “presence” in the moment could modulate the timing 
processes accordingly. In the current study, the relative overestimation of time 
was related to higher Thoughtlessness in self-reported impulsivity and shorter 
responses in SST. It is important to note that the retrospective time estimation 
paradigm was applied. In the prospective time judgment, temporal processes 
related to the clock stage of the SET model would be more evident and are 
generally associated with various impulsivity measures (Baumann & Odum, 
2012; Reynolds et al., 2006). Retrospective timing is assumed to reflect 
memory-related and attention processes (Zakay & Block, 2004). In 
retrospective time judgment, contextual change is related to the processing of 
non-temporal stimuli, with more information encoded in the memory resulting 
in the overestimation of duration. In the emotional context, retrospective 
duration judgments are related to both the valence of affect and interoceptive 
attentional focus (Pollatos et al., 2014). Hence, the differences in sentient 
processing might be important in retrospective judgments as stronger levels of 
emotional activation during the timing task would also affect the attention 
mechanism, contributing to the processing of temporal and non-temporal 
information. The overall negative affect experienced by impulsive individuals 
could explain the relative time dilation whereas past positive experience is 
perceived to have passed quikly (Danckert & Allman, 2005; Pollatos et al., 
2014). The results obtained regarding the relationship between prospective and 
retrospective timing tasks in Study II indicate the involvement of some 
common timing mechanism, irrespective to the temporal task. Therefore, it is 
possible that common clock mechanisms are involved in a variety of context, 
contributing to self-reported and behavioural impulsivity. In addition, common 
brain circuits underlying both impulsive behaviour and time perception have 
been implicated. More precisely, Bari and Robbins (2013) have suggested that 
inhibitory processes in the brain are related to the activity in the basal ganglia 
and the cerebellum, which have also been suggested to be important regions for 
time perception (Coull et al., 2011). Moreover, DA activity in the striatum is 





process in impulsive behaviour (Bari et al., 2011), which in turn bears 
similarities with the DA hypothesis in the time perception research (Allman & 




Self-reported and behavioural impulsivity probably reflect different aspects of 
impulsive behaviour. The results from Study IV suggest that the sense of time, 
reflecting a clock mechanism fundamental to temporal processing, could 
account for various forms of impulsive behaviour. However, which exact 
processes within the SET framework (e.g., pacemaker, attention, accumulator, 
memory), involved in the passage of subjective time, explain the impulsive 
behaviour remains unresolved. Presently, activation, attention and memory 
processes are all implicated. Similarly to Studies I–III, the awareness of time 
and affective experience are implied to have a significant role in linking time 
perception and impulsive behaviour. The affective state of impulsive 
individuals might be related to their level of physiological arousal, attentional 
capture and thereby affecting the further processing of information in the 
memory. In addition, sentient processing is presumably different for an 
impulsive individual, contributing to the sense of time. These processes 
involved in time perception could also contribute to response inhibition in SST 





6 GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The human brain is generally very accurate in estimating time and therefore, the 
existence of an internal clock-like mechanism with biological origin has been 
proposed. Nevertheless, like any other psychological process, the estimation of 
time is sensitive to disturbances and occasionally subjected to errors. The 
research presented in this thesis explores time perception by varying the 
environmental conditions, the affective properties of the stimuli to be timed, and 
probes the role of time perception in relation to impulsive behaviour. 
Specifically, the attempt of the thesis is to further describe the mechanisms 
involved in time perception within the theoretical framework of the internal 
clock (Gibbon et al., 1984; Treisman, 1963). The obtained results suggest that 
arousal and attention processes independently are insufficient to explain the 
temperature effects and emotional modulations of time perception.  
The sensitivity of the internal clock to temperature changes is further 
elaborated in the traditional view of the “chemical clock” hypothesis (Hoagland, 
1933), according to which the pacemaker rate is affected by physiological 
arousal. An increase in core temperature is expected to increase the rate of the 
pacemaker and the time is perceived to pass slowly, thus resulting in an 
overestimation of temporal intervals. Studies I and II applied an interval 
production method in exercise-heat stress condition, which resulted in relative 
underproductions after an hour of exercise, indicating an increase in the rate of 
the pacemaker. A closer observation of several state-dependent variables in 
Study I suggested that physiological changes alone cannot account for the 
alterations of subjective time. Of course, the rise in core temperature is 
responsible for the perceived fatigue and exertion, affecting the overall 
perceived state of the subject. Study II provided further support to explain the 
temperature effects on time perception with changes in the hormone response 
and psychological state-dependent variables. 
Psychological state, more precisely, perceived fatigue appears to be an 
important factor explaining the impaired temporal processing in extreme 
environments. This implies a significant role of the emotional arousal and the 
emotional experience imposed by prolonged exercise in the hot environment. 
Physiological changes are accompanied by psychological changes and in terms 
of peripheral and central factors, the latter are involved in generating the 
conscious feeling of fatigue (St. Clair Gibson et al., 2003). Explaining the role 
of environmental factors, physiological changes and emotional processing in 
time perception benefits most from the interoceptive model (Craig, 2002; 
2009b), which provides a theoretical framework for describing how the general 
homeostatic state contributes to conscious bodily awareness. As a result, 
emotional experience and awareness of time within the current moment affect 
the sense of time. However, interoceptive processing does not rely solely on 
arousal and physiological changes. The conscious perception of self interacting 




processing emotional and temporal information. Therefore, the arousal-
pacemaker link is insufficient for interpreting the findings obtained in Studies I 
and II.  
Timing of emotional stimuli further emphasises the complex interplay 
between arousal, attention and sentient processing as revealed by Study III. 
More importantly, the emotional modulation of time strongly suggests applying 
a two-stage paradigm of affective attention in time perception. Use of the ERP 
correlates differentiating the early attentional capture and subsequent arousal 
processes induced by emotional stimuli provide means to disentangle the 
attention and arousal mechanisms of the internal clock. The behavioural results 
show no clear distinction in the produced durations between emotional and 
neutral stimuli, which confines interpretation solely in terms of arousal 
mechanism. Instead, the valence differences in the Early Posterior Negativity 
(EPN) indicate a more pronounced attentional capture of pleasant stimuli. In 
addition, the observed duration-dependent valence-specificity of time 
perception implies the role of a perceptual response and arousal mechanisms in 
timing the shorter intervals and the top-down attentional modulation in case of 
longer durations. Again, the results implicate interoceptive awareness in 
emotional modulation of time perception, which emphasises the role of context-
specific sentient processing (Schirmer, 2011). Therefore, the inherent 
relationship between activation and attention mechanisms with supplementary 
sentient processing should be considered.  
Finally, Study IV suggests that time perception appears to be the general 
property of impulsive behaviour, explaining the differences in both self-
reported and behavioural impulsivity. More specifically, both the excitatory and 
inhibitory responses are related to the sense of time, possibly indicating a faster 
cognitive tempo of impulsive individuals. However, the underlying mechanism 
of the altered sense of time remains inconclusive. Clearly, the affective 
properties of impulsive behaviour should be considered, especially when 
temporal awareness and emotional experience are closely linked (Craig, 2009). 
The differences in timing performance could be explained by stronger sentient 
processing in impulsive individuals when unsuccessfully inhibiting their 
response or exhibiting inability to adjust their performance to task requirements 
(Wittmann et al., 2014). The affective disposition of impulsive individuals 
might be related to the level of activation, attentional capture and also to 
inefficient sentient processing, resulting in self-attributed dysfunctional 
behaviour, the inability to apply inhibition control and accurately estimate time.  
To conclude, there is still considerable uncertainty about the way time is 
perceived in the brain but the work presented in this thesis provides additional 
insight into the mechanisms of time perception. More precisely, the 
investigation of the way time perception mechanisms operate should include the 
role of psychological state in perceived time. Specifically, the significant 
contribution of emotional factors reveals that our subjective time is closely 




From the methodological aspect, time perception research would immensely 
benefit from other disciplines of cognitive neuroscience, especially from 
employing the affective attention paradigm. In conclusion, attention and arousal 
mechanisms in time perception tend to be inherently linked and should be 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Ajataju mõjutavad füsioloogilised ja psühholoogilised tegurid 
Inimese aju on aja kulgemise hindamisel üldiselt väga täpne ning seetõttu 
eeldatakse, et meil on olemas bioloogilist päritolu kellalaadne mehhanism. 
Olenemata sellest on ajataju sarnaselt teistele psühholoogilistele töötlus-
protsessidele tundlik erinevate ärritajate suhtes ning seetõttu võib aja-
hinnangutes ilmneda ka ebatäpsust. Käesolev doktoritöö uurib ajataju 
ekstreemsetes keskkonnatingimustes, emotsionaalsete ärritajate töötlemisel ning 
seoses impulsiivse käitumisega. Töö põhiliseks eesmärgiks on kirjeldada ajataju 
mehhanisme sisemise kella teoreetilisest raamistikust lähtuvalt (Gibbon jt., 
1984; Treisman, 1963) ning täpsustada organismi aktivatsioonitaseme ja 
tähelepanuprotsesside rolli ajahinnangute muutlikkuses. 
Uuringud I ja II lähtuvad sisemise kella temperatuuritundlikkusest ning 
täpsustavad traditsioonilist “keemilise kella” käsitlust (Hoagland, 1993), mille 
kohaselt muudab kehaline erutusseisund sisemise taktiseadja tööd. Keha 
süvatemperatuuri tõusuga kaasneb sisemise kella kiirenemine ning sellest 
tulenevalt tajutakse väliseid sündmusi aeglasemalt ja ajalisi kestusi hinnatakse 
pikemaks. Uuringud I ja II kasutasid ajataju uurimiseks intervallide 
produtseerimise ülesannet ning seda kuumastressi tingimuses treenimise 
jooksul, mille tulemusena muutusid produtseeritud intervallid tunni aja järel 
oluliselt lühemaks. See osutab sisemise kella kiirenenud tööle. Uuring I näitas, 
et taoline kiirenemine ei ole tingitud vaid kehatemperatuuri tõusust, kuigi 
kehatemperatuuri tõusu tulemusena ilmnevad muutused psüühilises seisundis ja 
enesetunde näitajates, mis on omakorda seotud väsimuse ja pingutuse kohta 
antavate subjektiivsete hinnangutega. Uuringu II eesmärk oli tuvastada ajataju 
protsesside muutlikkust kuumaga adapteerumisel. Saadud tulemused toetasid 
psüühilise seisundi olulisust temperatuuri mõju avaldumisel subjektiivse 
ajamulje kujunemisele kuumastressi tingimustes.  
Psüühiline seisund, mida käesolevas uuringus väljendasid väsimustundele 
antud hinnangud, on kõrge temperatuuriga keskkonnas subjektiivse ajamulje 
kujunemisel oluline. Seda saab sisemise kella raamistikus vaadelda ka kui 
emotsionaalse erutusseisundi näitajat. Lähtudes sellest, et füsioloogiliste 
muutustega kaasnevad muutused psüühilises seisundis (ja vastupidi), siis 
peegeldavad tajutud väsimushinnangud pigem kesknärvisüsteemi kõrgemate 
struktuuride osalust kui otseseid muutusi kehalistes protsessides (St. Clair 
Gibson jt., 2003). Antud tulemusi on võimalik tõlgendada interotseptiivse 
teadlikkuse mudeli põhjal (Craig, 2002; 2009b), mille järgi keha üldine 
homöostaatiline seisund annab sisendi kehalise seisundi teadvustatud 
tunnetamisele ja hindamisele. Oma kehalise seisundi tunnetamine on omakorda 
seotud emotsionaalse kogemuse ja olemasolevast ajahetkest teadlik olemisega, 
mis moonutab ajataju. Interotseptiivsed protsessid ei hõlma aga vaid kehalist 




(siin just kuumastressi tingimustes) on oluline ka tähelepanu suunamine oma 
psüühilisele ja kehalisele seisundile. Seetõttu on uuringutes I ja II saadud ajataju 
tulemuste seletamine erutusprotsesside ja taktiseadja töö põhjal ebapiisav. 
Emotsionaalsete ärritajate kestuse hindamine uuringus III rõhutab veelgi 
enam tähelepanu osaluse olulisust ajataju muutlikkuses lisaks aktivatsiooni 
tasemes toimuvatele muutustele. Lisaks julgustab uuring III emotsionaalse 
ajataju uurimisel lähtuma kahe-faasilisest emotsionaalse tähelepanu käsitlusest 
ning rakendama ajataju ajukorrelaatide registreerimisel afektiivse ärritaja 
töötlusega seotud sündmuspotentsiaale (ERP). Viimased eristavad täpsemalt nii 
tähelepanu varajast ja pigem automaatset töötlusstaadiumit kui ka hilisemat 
spetsiifilisemat töötlust, mis peegeldab ärritaja poolt esilekutsutud üldist 
aktivatsiooni. Selline lähenemine võimaldab emotsionaalse ajataju alus-
mehhanisme paremini tuvastada ning võimalusel eristada aktivatsiooni ja 
tähelepanu kaasatust. Produtseeritud kestused uuringus III ei eristanud 
emotsionaalsete ja neutraalsete stiimulite töötlust piisava täpsusega, seetõttu ei 
ole võimalik ajatajus toimunud muutusi vaid afektiivse erutusseisundi ja 
sisemise kella kiiruse muutustega seletada. Afektiivse tähelepanu ajukorrelaadid 
näitasid positiivse valentsiga visuaalse ärritaja ajastamisel tähelepanu varajase 
töötluse suuremat osalust. Lisaks ilmnesid intervallist sõltuvad erinevused 
positiivse ja negatiivse ärritaja puhul. Need erinevused viitavad aktivatsiooni-
mehhanismi ja automaatsete töötlusprotsesside osalusele lühemate intervallide 
korral ning tähelepanu rollile pikemate kestuste hindamisel. Kui negatiivsed 
ärritajad tingisid subjektiivse aja kiirenemise lühemate kestuste juures, siis 
positiivsed ärritajad viisid sama tulemuseni pikemate kestuste hindamisel. 
Uuringus III saadud tulemused rõhutavad nii aktivatsiooni kui tähelepanu 
osalust emotsionaalsete ajamodulatsioonide ilmnemisel ning lubavad oletada, et 
emotsionaalse kogemuse hindamine on kontekstispetsiifiline (Schirmer, 2011). 
Uuringus IV leiti seos ajahinnangute ning erinevate impulsiivsusemõõdikute 
vahel, mille põhjal saab järeldada, et ajataju on üks impulsiivset käitumist 
kirjeldavatest omadustest. Võimalik, et impulsiivsetel indiviididel on kiirem 
kognitiivne tempo, mis väljendub nii impulsi kontrolli ja reaktsioonide 
pidurdamise häirumises kui ka enesekohaste impulsiivsete käitumisviiside 
raporteerimises. Täpne alusmehhanism käesoleva seose puhul on ebaselge, kuid 
tõenäoliselt saab ka siin luua seoseid afektiivsete töötlusprotsesside ja 
ajahinnangute vahel. Impulsiivsete indiviidide ajataju erinevusi saab seletada ka 
intensiivsema emotsionaalse kogemuse ja infotöötlusega, mistõttu reaktsioonide 
pidurdamine häirub ning ilmneb suutmatus kohandada oma sooritust ülesande 
nõuetele vastavalt (Wittmann jt., 2014). Impulsiivsete indiviidide kalduvus 
intensiivsemale afektiivsele kogemusele võib olla seotud eripäradega nii 
erutusseisundis kui ka tähelepanu töötluses. 
Käesolev töö näitab, et ajataju tundlikkus erinevates seisundites ei ole seotud 
ainult füsioloogilise erutusega vaid hõlmab ka psühholoogilisi tegureid ning 
eelkõige emotsionaalset seisundit. Lisaks ilmneb, et nii ekstreemsetes 




alusmehhanismide – tähelepanu töötlusprotsesside ja aktivatsioonitaseme – 
koostööl. Sealjuures on vajalik täpsustada emotsionaalsele ja kehalisele 
seisundile hinnangu andmise rolli subjektiivse ajamulje kujunemisel. 
Kokkuvõttes saab öelda, et ajataju alusmehhanismide uurimisel tasub rakendada 
afektiivse tähelepanu lähenemist ning pigem vaadelda organismi aktivatsiooni 
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